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MINORITY RIGHTS,
MINORITY WRONGS
Elena A. Baylis∗
Many of the new democracies established in the last twenty
years are severely ethnically divided, with numerous minority
groups, languages, and religions. As part of the process of democratization, there has also been an explosion of “national human rights
institutions,” that is, independent government agencies whose purpose is to promote enforcement of human rights. But despite the significance of minority concerns to the stability and success of these
new democracies, and despite the relevance of minority rights to the
mandates of national human rights institutions, a surprisingly limited number of national human rights institutions have directed programs and resources to addressing minority issues. This article explores the activities of national human rights institutions, identifying
regional and content trends in these programs, identifying factors
correlating to the existence of such programs, and considering the
implications of these patterns for the established legal frameworks
for minority and indigenous rights. Finally, this article suggests
some productive roles that national human rights institutions might
play in protecting the interests of minority groups.
∗

Assistant Professor, University of Pittsburgh School of Law. Thanks to Pat Chew, Vivian
Curran, Carolyn Evans, Owen Fiss, Don Munro, Charles Norchi, John Parry, Linda Reif, Michael Reisman, and Dinah Shelton, and to the participants in faculty workshops at the University of Pittsburgh Law School and Villanova Law School. Thanks to all those who kindly
discussed their work with national human rights institutions with me, and in particular to the
International Ombudsman Institute for welcoming me to its VIIIth International Ombudsman
Conference and to Dean Gottehrer for facilitating contacts with other ombudspersons.
Thanks also to the American Society of International Law for awarding me the opportunity to
present my work on the New Voices panel at its 2004 Annual Meeting, and to the ASIL and
the Academic Council on the United Nations System for sponsoring my participation in an
ACUNS/ASIL summer workshop. Finally, I am grateful to my indefatigable research assistants, Jennedy Santolla, Meredith Schultz, Jeremy Seeman, and Zak Shusterman.

66

BAYLIS

Minority Rights, Minority Wrongs

9/11/2006

67

INTRODUCTION ..............................................................................................68
I. POLITICAL AND LEGAL BACKDROP ....................................................73
A. Community Complexity and Conflict..........................................73
B. Minority Rights............................................................................75
i. In Democracy Theory and State Practice...............................76
a. Traditional Liberalism......................................................76
b. Liberal Pluralism..............................................................77
c. Communitarianism...........................................................78
d. Common Elements...........................................................80
ii. In International Law...............................................................81
II. NATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS INSTITUTIONS AND MINORITY GROUPS .....85
A. What Are National Human Rights Institutions? ..........................85
B. Minority-directed Programs.........................................................89
i. Regional Trends.....................................................................90
ii. Content Trends.......................................................................95
a. Accessibility.....................................................................95
b. Anti-discrimination ..........................................................96
c. Cultural Claims ................................................................97
d. Inter-ethnic and Religious Conflicts ................................99
e. No Minority-directed Programs .....................................100
III. IMPLICATIONS ...................................................................................101
A. Factors Correlating to Minority-directed Programs...................101
i. International and Regional Legal Regimes..........................101
a. UN Benchmarks.............................................................101
b. Regional Institutions ......................................................103
ii. Limited Political Purposes and Resources...........................105
B. Implications for the Minority Rights Framework......................107
i. Core Interests of the State ....................................................108
ii. Categories of Minority Groups ............................................112
iii. Collective Claims.................................................................116
iv. Indigenous Systems .............................................................120
IV.THE ROLE OF NATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS INSTITUTIONS ......................125
A. Identifying and Incorporating Minority Claims.........................126
i. Good Offices........................................................................127
ii. Best Practices.......................................................................127
iii. Addressing Claims...............................................................128
B. Dialogue and Consultation ........................................................129
i. In Theory and Practice .........................................................129
ii. With Indigenous Systems ....................................................131
iii. In Minority Rights Treaties..................................................137
CONCLUSION ................................................................................................137

BAYLIS

68

9/11/2006

10 UCLA J. INT’L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 66 (2005)
INTRODUCTION

Since the fall of the communist bloc fifteen years ago, the practice of
democracy has spread infectiously from the old epicenters of Soviet power
in Russia, Central Asia, and Eastern Europe through the distant African,
Asian, and American satellite states sponsored by the Cold War conflict.
Some genuine democratic transitions have taken place, while other shifts
have been democratic more in form than in substance. But most of the countries of the world now at least go through the motions of holding elections
and making verbal obeisance to concomitant respect for constitutional limits
on government authority and incarnations of universal human rights. Unless
a nation has the economic, military, or political clout to shoulder its way into
the world community on its own, at least some show of reverence for these
values is perceived as necessary for successful participation in vital international institutions and processes.1
In the wake of these developments, there has been an explosion of “national human rights institutions,” that is, independent government agencies
whose purpose is to promote enforcement of human rights. Whereas there
were only a few national human rights institutions before 1970, hundreds
were established in the democratization wave of the 1990s.2
Like holding elections, drafting constitutions with pristinely separated
powers and lengthy human rights guarantees, and ratifying international human rights instruments, creating national human rights institutions has provided a way for new democracies to signal to the international community

1

See MONTY G. MARSHALL & KEITH JAGGERS, CTR. FOR INT’L DEV. & CONFLICT MGMT.,
POLITY IV COUNTRY REPORTS 2003: GLOBAL REGIMES BY TYPE 1946-2003,
http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/inscr/polity/report.htm (last visited Feb. 25, 2006) [hereinafter
POLITY IV COUNTRY REPORTS] (dataset measuring global, regional, and national trends in democratization).
2
See RICHARD CARVER, INT’L COUNCIL ON HUMAN RIGHTS POLICY (ICHRP), PERFORMANCE
AND LEGITIMACY: NATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS INSTITUTIONS 57-59 (2000) [hereinafter ICHRP
REPORT]; Office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights, Fact Sheet No.19, National Institutions for the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights,
http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu6/2/fs19.htm (last visited Feb. 25, 2006) [hereinafter
UNHCHR Fact Sheet]. The United States has not established national human rights institutions as such on the federal level, preferring to channel such concerns exclusively through the
courts, apart from a few specialized bodies like the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, which focuses on a narrow set of issues, and the Helsinki Commission, which focuses
primarily (but not exclusively) on foreign rather than domestic compliance with certain human rights obligations. However, corollary institutions such as human rights commissions
and ombudspersons are more common in the United States on the state and municipal level.
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their commitment to human rights and liberal values.3 These institutions look
much alike on paper, but their actual effect has varied enormously from state
to state. While some have languished in limbo, awaiting legislative implementation or the appointment of key officials, many are active, and some
have become influential forces promoting human rights within their states.4
Minority groups5 should be a primary constituency for institutions
whose purpose is to promote successful democratization and whose mandate
is to investigate claimed abuses and to protect vulnerable populations. Many
transitioning states6 are highly ethnically divided: from Afghanistan to the
3

Of course, this signaling purpose for acceding to international human rights standards is by
no means unique to new democracies. See David H. Moore, A Signaling Theory of Human
Rights Compliance, 97 NW. U.L. REV. 879 (2003). But the development of new norms and
institutions are steps that are inherent to the process of creating a new government, and are
therefore characteristic of, although not exclusive to, new democracies’ efforts to signal compliance and thereby establish international credibility.
4
See ICHRP REPORT, supra note 2, at 111-17.
5
I am using the term “minority group” here and throughout the article to refer to a nonmajority community in a state made up of multiple communities, including ethnic, racial, and
religious groups. This term, like the others used to describe groups in this article, is both
highly contestable and vigorously contested. See, e.g., Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, Explanatory Report, ¶ 12, opened for signature Feb. 1, 1995, Europ. T.S. No. 157 (entered into force Feb. 1, 1998) [hereinafter Framework Convention] (“It
should also be pointed out that the framework Convention contains no definition of the notion
of ‘national minority’ . . . . based on the recognition that at this stage, it is impossible to arrive
at a definition capable of mustering general support of all Council of Europe member
States.”). Nonetheless, I am employing the term “minority group” in this context because it
and its variants (e.g., “national minority,” “ethnic minority”) are in wide use in the relevant
legal documents and academic literature, in spite of their shortcomings. In particular, because
I am discussing a set of legal rights that are commonly referred to as “minority rights,” it is
helpful to use a corresponding term to describe the groups to whom those rights might accrue.
Those attempting to define the term “minority” have managed to reach agreement that a minority is a group of people within a state. The sticking points have been: (1) whether the test
for minority status should be objective or subjective or both; (2) if objective, (a) whether the
relevant criterion for minority status should be relative numbers or power or both, and (b)
what other criteria are relevant for defining the scope of groups, e.g. ethnic, religious, or linguistic differences; and (3) if subjective, whether the relevant viewpoint should be that of
other communities, that of the group in question, or both. See, e.g., U.N. Comm’n on Human
Rights, Sub-Comm. on Prevention of Discrimination and Prot. of Minorities, Study on the
Rights of Persons Belonging to Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities, ¶¶ 560-68, U.N.
Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/384/1979/Rev.1 (June 1979) (prepared by Francesco Capotorti) (hereinafter Capotorti).
6
A number of ongoing studies survey modern political transitions. Elias Papaioannou and
Gregorios Siourounis identify 62 states as having moved to full or partial democracy in the
“third wave” of democratization, while David Epstein and his collaborators identify 86 countries that have shifted between full democracy, partial democracy, and autocracy during the
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Balkan states, from Uganda to Nepal, these states comprise numerous ethnic
groups, languages, and religions.7 These divisions and the conflicts they produce represent a fundamental challenge for the continuing existence of these
states. In these sensitized contexts, national human rights institutions seeking to safeguard minority rights could find a legal mandate for at least some
action in international human rights law, which has long enshrined basic protections for minority groups against discrimination and cultural or physical
destruction.8
Nonetheless, few of the newly established institutions in transitioning
states report developing programs to reach minority populations effectively,
and many shy away from involvement in their conflicts. Instead, the institutions that report establishing programs or offices to address minority concerns tend to be in better established democracies and less severely divided
societies. The programs that do exist in transitioning states tend to be limited, both in their aspirations and in their implementation.9
To some extent these lapses can be described in pragmatic terms, as
failures of resources, legal imagination, or political will. But the experiences
of those national human rights institutions that have implemented minoritydirected programs suggest another concern: in some settings, the current legal frameworks for protection of minority rights do not accurately map the
concerns of either minority groups or the state. Instead, those frameworks

sample period. See Elias Papaioannou & Gregorios Siourounis, Economic and Social Factors
Driving the Third Wave of Democratization (London Business School, Working Paper, Jan.
2005), available at http://phd.london.edu/epapaioannou/detrm_democ_jan.pdf; David L. Epstein et al., Democratic Transitions (Working Paper, Apr. 17, 2005), available at
www.columbia.edu/cu/ciber/research/Transitionsv5.pdf. Detailed country data and analysis is
available in the Polity IV database. See POLITY IV COUNTRY REPORTS, supra note 1.
7
Several recent studies attempt to define and measure ethnic division in each state on a
worldwide basis. Particularly relevant for this article is James Fearon’s 2003 study of ethnic
fractionalization, which thoughtfully discusses the problems of definition and measurement
and presents data on 160 countries worldwide. This study suggests, among other findings,
that sub-Saharan Africa is far more complexly divided than the rest of the world, and that
states in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union tend to be substantially more ethnically
divided than most Western European states. James D. Fearon, Ethnic and Cultural Diversity
by Country, 8 J. ECON. GROWTH 195, 215-19 (2003); see also Alberto Alesina et al., Fractionalization, 8 J. ECON. GROWTH 155 (2003); Minorities at Risk Project, Ctr. for Int’l Dev.
and Conflict Mgmt., http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/inscr/mar/data.asp (last visited Feb. 25,
2006) (providing data on 284 politically-active ethnic groups).
8
See discussion, infra, Part I.
9
As discussed below, many of the severely divided or transitioning states that do have minority-directed programs are current or aspiring members of the European Union, spurred to action by EU mandates. See discussion, infra, Part II.
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reflect idealized conceptions of state goals and define minority group interests according to inaccurate and outmoded categories, leaving vulnerable
constituencies unprotected and institutions without a mandate or rationale for
intervention. Indeed, the reports from national human rights institutions
suggest the “problem cases” that have always existed on the fringes of democratic theory and positive law are no longer the exception, but, rather, are
becoming some of the most important and frequent of their minority claims.
National human rights institutions offer a particularly useful vantage
point for considering these issues. While legal scholars and political scientists have the luxury of debating the nature of minority rights at their leisure,
and while courts rule on minority claims that have been reformulated into
the proper legal jargon, national human rights institutions are the forum to
which people come to demand their rights directly. These institutions must
make day-to-day decisions on how best to navigate the conflicts and convergences of human rights and minority interests in the problems that come before them. Their practical experiences and assessments of the gaps in the
principles that ought to guide them provide a prism for viewing the contested
ideals advocated by constitutional court doctrines and ivory-tower elites.
This article reviews the work of institutions in four regions: Africa,
South and Southeast Asia, Central and South America, and Europe, as well
as Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and the U.S., to the extent such institutions exist in this country. Part I begins with a discussion of the system of
minority rights that provides the framework for the work of national human
rights institutions on these issues. In part II, I provide a brief introduction to
national human rights institutions and then examine the patterns that can be
observed in their work with minority groups. There are striking regional
trends, with minority-directed programs increasing rapidly in Europe as
compared to the rest of the world, and with few programs reported in Asia or
in the highly fractionalized African states. There are also trends in the content of minority-directed programs, which tend to emphasize improving institutional accessibility and addressing discrimination claims. But the most
striking pattern is not in the content or scope of the known programs, but in
their absence. In many states, either national human rights institutions are
not doing any work on discrimination or other minority group concerns, or if
they are, they are not reporting it as such.
Part III considers the implications of these observations, first looking for
correlations with international and regional legal frameworks and with political factors, and then evaluating the minority rights framework described
in part I in light of the reports from national human rights institutions that do
describe work on minority issues. Those reports identify gaps in the core
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concepts that are the building blocks for minority rights theory and law.
They also recount their attempts to contend with collective community concerns and with the familiar but still unresolved tension between concepts of
justice in indigenous10 legal systems and other human rights values. Finally,
part IV proposes a role for national human rights institutions in reshaping
our current conceptions of minority rights and in contributing to the much
praised but little practiced notion of dialogue and consultation between minority groups and the state.
The experiences of national human rights institutions attest that minority
interests are more varied and complex than present legal categories admit.
To be effective in addressing those interests, the minority rights framework
must be able to encompass that complexity. But it is not enough to create a
more elaborate set of groups, a longer list of rights, or a more sophisticated
set of mechanisms for accessing them. For what is characterized as “minority interests” or sought after as “minority rights” is not a static, absolute set
of interests determined by the characteristics of the community or by its minority status. Rather, it is an evolving product of the relationships amongst
communities, and between communities and the state. Until we develop
models for assessing the conflicting claims that emerge from these relationships, “minority rights” as such will remain relevant only to the narrow set
of circumstances, states, and groups from which they originally evolved; and
even there, less and less so. National human rights institutions do not solve
this problem, but they do offer a means of gaining the richer understanding
of minority concerns that is necessary to grapple with it.

10
As with the term “minority group” (see discussion supra note 5), there is no single authoritative definition for the term “indigenous.” The term originated as a self-designation to facilitate political activism in the UN and other international contexts. See JOHN H. BODLEY,
CULTURAL ANTHROPOLOGY: TRIBES, STATES, AND THE GLOBAL SYSTEM 392 (1996). The International Labour Organization defines indigenous peoples as:
[P]eoples in independent countries who are regarded as indigenous on account
of their descent from the populations which inhabited the country, or a geographical region to which the country belongs, at the time of conquest or colonisation or the establishment of present state boundaries and who, irrespective of
their legal status, retain some or all of their own social, economic, cultural and
political institutions.
Int’l Labour Org. [ILO], Convention Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries, art. 1, ILO Convention No. 169 (June 7, 1989) (entered into force Sept. 5,
1991) [hereinafter ILO Convention No. 169], available at http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/cgilex/convde.pl?C169. The convention also endorses self-identification as “a fundamental criterion” for indigenous or tribal status. Id.
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I. POLITICAL AND LEGAL BACKDROP
A.

Community Complexity and Conflict

Most modern political states are comprised of multiple communities—
ethnic, religious, linguistic, and cultural—that have conflicting interests,
rights, and political preferences. But while many long-standing democracies
may rightly consider themselves multi-ethnic states, the transitioning states
of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union are on average one-and-ahalf times as ethnically diverse as Western Europe, while sub-Saharan Africa
is nearly three times as diverse, with over 37 of 43 sub-Saharan states more
ethnically divided than any state in Western Europe.11 Some states are composed of hundreds of groups, as in Nigeria, Chad, Papua New Guinea, and
Nepal. In some instances, ethnic and religious identities predominate over
national ones. Inter-group rivalries and allegiances may be inconstant and
shifting or may extend back for generations before the establishment of the
state.12 Adding to this already complex picture is the accelerating movement
of peoples and information across political borders, catalyzing rapid, dynamic changes in community and national identities.
Each state must determine how to accommodate its communities’ divergent interests within its political and legal structure. But in the absence of
measures specifically designed to address minority groups, ordinary state institutions and processes may not offer effective avenues for minority groups
to raise their concerns. While well-established states struggle with these issues, the problem can be particularly acute for transitioning states. By its nature, of course, the democratic process limits minority influence in policymaking by centering political power in majoritarian institutions. This problem can be exacerbated in transitioning states that have mastered the form of
democracy in the shape of elections, but have not developed the underpinnings of strong political parties or institutions of civil society that might integrate minority constituent interests into political platforms. Legal mechanisms may also be inadequate to resolve minority concerns. Guaranteed
civil and political rights may not be directly enforceable in court, for example, or may not encompass minority groups’ interests, as when those interests concern questions of autonomy or community control of mineral resources or land.13
11

See Fearon, supra note 7, Table 3 at 212, app. at 215-19.
See, e.g., DONALD L. HOROWITZ, ETHNIC GROUPS IN CONFLICT (1985); ROTIMI N. SUBERU,
FEDERALISM AND ETHNIC CONFLICT IN NIGERIA (2001).
13
See id.
12
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In these contexts states have adopted a range of political accommodations, from explicit political power-sharing arrangements on the national
level, to local guarantees of self-government, to deliberate repression of nondominant minority groups and identities. They have also adopted legal accommodations in the form of minority rights.14
At this point it is worth pausing to consider why this issue is important
to states. Why don’t states simply ignore the claims of non-dominant communities who do not succeed in asserting those claims through the existing
political and legal structure? Often, of course, states do ignore minority
claims. But just as often they cannot. If the state lacks the means to suppress, or at least to contain, separatist movements and minority calls for recognition and autonomy, it must somehow conciliate them or risk destabilization.15 Often, it is the reality of violent conflict that moves a state to take
account of minority concerns.16 Indeed, ethnic and religious conflict is a frequent catalyst of unrest, war, and state failure; separatist movements among
communities that feel alienated from the state threaten the identity and territorial integrity of states from the Russian Federation to Indonesia to Iraq.
Where internal pressure to entertain minority concerns is not sufficient,
international pressure and regional interests often play a role. In Europe, for
example, candidate states must demonstrate “respect for and protection of
minorities” to meet the Copenhagen Criteria for accession to the European
Union, and the long-embattled province of Kosovo must ensure adequate
minority protections as one prerequisite for resolving its political status.17
Finally, while states with a true commitment to liberal democratic values
may debate how and to what extent minority values should be accommodated, they will find themselves hard-pressed to deny entirely minority
communities’ claims without abandoning fundamental precepts of justice
and equality.18
14

See RODOLFO STAVENHAGEN, THE ETHNIC QUESTION: CONFLICTS, DEVELOPMENT AND
HUMAN RIGHTS 129-41 (1990).
15
See, e.g., Shaista Shameem, New Impulses in the Interaction of Law and Religion: The Fiji
Human Rights Commission in Context, 2003 BYU L. REV. 661, 662 (2003).
16
See Kieran McEvoy & John Morison, Beyond the “Constitutional Moment”: Law, Transition, and Peacemaking in Northern Ireland, 26 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 961, 993 n.101 (2003);
Honourable Hari N. Ramkarran, Seeking a Democratic Path: Constitutional Reform in Guyana, 32 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 585, 597-98 (2004).
17
See EU Monitoring and Advocacy Program, Minority Protection,
http://www.eumap.org/topics/minority (last visited Feb. 26, 2006); Paul R. Williams, Earned
Sovereignty: The Road to Resolving the Conflict over Kosovo’s Final Status, 31 DENV. J.
INT’L. L. & POL’Y 387 (2003).
18
See Mark D. Rosen, Liberalism and Illiberalism: “Illiberal” Societal Cultures, Liberalism,
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Minority Rights

Under these influences and imperatives, many states have pursued
strategies of limited accommodation, including the recognition of a range of
minority rights.19 Over the last fifty years, a body of international and regional treaties has developed guaranteeing some rights to minority and indigenous groups.20 These rights range from rights of self-determination, to
rights to promote their own culture, religion, and language, to rights of
equality and non-discrimination under the law.21 Some of these rights are
contained in fundamental international human rights treaties, whereas others
are the subject of newer multilateral treaties focused specifically on minority
groups.22 Especially in the last fifteen years, constitutions and national legislation have implemented some minority and indigenous rights protections.23
However, the legitimacy of minority rights as such is highly contested,
and the nature of those rights (if their legitimacy is accepted in principle),
hardly less so. There are three problematic aspects to defining minority
rights: determining the content of those rights, determining to which groups
those rights will accrue, and determining whether the rights are collective or
individual in nature.24
and American Constitutionalism, 12 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 803, 830-31 (2002).
19
Protecting minority rights rather than universal rights is not a new phenomenon, but rather
represents a resurgence of an earlier practice. After World War I, the fear that minority
groups’ vulnerability presented a threat to international peace spurred, states to agree to bilateral and then multilateral treaties protecting particular minority groups. These earlier treaties
were then superseded by the individual human rights approach after World War II. See WILL
KYMLICKA, MULTICULTURAL CITIZENSHIP 2 (1985); Capotorti, supra note 5, ¶ 92.
20
For discussions of the contested definitions of the terms “minority group” and “indigenous
group,” see supra notes 5, 10.
21
See, e.g., Int’l Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 1, 26-27, opened for signature
Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976) [hereinafter ICCPR];
Framework Convention, supra note 5; ILO Convention No. 169, supra note 10, art. 3.
22
See id. However, many of the most robust and well elaborated statements of minority
rights come in the form of unenforceable declarations and many are subject to numerous caveats acknowledging the ultimate sovereignty of the state. See, e.g., Draft United Nations
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC],
Sub-Comm. on Prevention of Discrimination & Prot. of Minorities Res. 1994/45, Annex,
U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/SUB.2/RES/1994/45 (Aug. 26, 1994); Authorities and Precedents in International and Domestic Law for the Proposed American Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, Inter-Am. C.H.R., OEA/Ser.L/V/II.110, doc. 22 (2001), available at
http://www.cidh.oas.org/Indigenas/Indigenas.en.01/index.htm.
23
See, e.g., ETH. CONST. art. 39. States have also entered bilateral treaties for the protection
of particular minority groups.
24
See Miriam J. Aukerman, Definitions and Justifications: Minority and Indigenous Group
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i. In Democracy Theory and State Practice

In considering these questions, democracy theorists who focus on minority rights offer a range of views about the proper place and scope of those
rights.25 For purposes of this discussion, there are three focal points on this
spectrum that represent important touchstones for newly emerging democracies: traditional liberalism, liberal pluralism, and communitarianism.26
a. Traditional Liberalism
Liberal thinkers such as Chandran Kukathas and Jürgen Habermas argue
that the core of legitimate democracy is individual, liberal rights. Traditional, or classic, liberals contend that these rights adequately protect minority cultures, and that minority group claims that cannot be characterized as
classic liberal, individual rights inevitably conflict with and diminish those
individual rights in practice.27 The United States has, by and large, adopted
this approach, providing minorities with the full gamut of individual political
Protections in a Central/East European Context, 22.4 HUM. RTS. Q. 1011, 1030-32 (2000).
25
The writing on the place of minority group rights in the democratic state is only one branch,
albeit a fairly discrete one, of the vast literature on minority and majority groups in the modern state. See, e.g., AREND LIJPHART, DEMOCRACY IN PLURAL SOCIETIES (1977); ERNEST
GELLNER, NATIONS AND NATIONALISM (1983); DONALD L. HOROWITZ, ETHNIC GROUPS IN
CONFLICT (1985); BENEDICT ANDERSON, IMAGINED COMMUNITIES: REFLECTIONS ON THE
ORIGIN AND SPREAD OF NATIONALISM (1991); HURST HANNUM, AUTONOMY, SOVEREIGNTY
AND SELF-DETERMINATION: THE ACCOMMODATION OF CONFLICTING RIGHTS (1990); STEPHEN
TIERNEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AND NATIONAL PLURALISM (2004).
26
Surrounding these three focal points are numerous subtle distinctions and debates that I
cannot explore here, in the interest of focusing on those aspects that are most crucial to my
study. Several concerns that I do not discuss are the relative “thickness” or “thinness” of national and minority identities, the significance of other political values to this debate, and the
contested definitions of virtually every crucial term. See, e.g., MULTICULTURALISM (Amy
Gutmann ed., 1994) (essays include Charles Taylor, The Politics of Recognition; Jürgen
Habermas, Struggles for Recognition in the Democratic Constitutional State; and K. Anthony
Appiah, Identity, Authenticity, Survival: Multicultural Societies and Social Reproduction).
27
A correctly understood theory of rights requires a politics of recognition that protects the
integrity of the individual in the life contexts in which his or her identity is formed. This does
not require an alternative model that would correct the individualistic design of the system of
rights through other normative perspectives. All that is required is the consistent actualization
of the system of rights. See Jürgen Habermas, Struggles for Recognition in the Democratic
Constitutional State, in MULTICULTURALISM, supra note 26, at 113. Chandran Kukathas
makes the more modest claim that while liberalism may not optimally protect minority interests, it nonetheless provides the best possibility for conflicting groups and individuals to coexist by not promoting any individual or group notion of the good but merely “upholding the
framework of law within which individuals and groups can function peacefully.” CHANDRAN
KUKATHAS, THE LIBERAL ARCHIPELAGO: A THEORY OF DIVERSITY AND FREEDOM 249 (2003).
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and civil liberties including the right to be free from discrimination, and offering particular minority protections only through narrowly crafted exceptions granting autonomy for Native Americans and permitting racial distinctions to facilitate certain affirmative action programs.
b. Liberal Pluralism
“Liberal pluralists” such as Will Kymlicka and Charles Taylor argue
that traditional theorists err by conceiving of the liberal state as culturally
neutral, whereas it in fact possesses and enforces certain culturally specific
characteristics (such as its choice of official language) on a multicultural polity.28 Because individuals value their cultures and can exercise freedom of
choice meaningfully only in the context of those cultures, individual autonomy requires that minority cultures be preserved. Accordingly, providing
some additional, systematic protections for minority groups with other cultural characteristics will not necessarily conflict with, and in fact will often
promote, core liberal values of justice and individual autonomy.29
The difficult questions for liberal pluralists are identifying which groups
should be entitled to protections, what sorts of claims should be recognized,
and what sort of protections are appropriate. Liberal pluralists such as Kymlicka have developed a typology of groups (e.g., immigrants, national minorities, and indigenous groups) and of the corresponding claims they might
make (non-discrimination, respect for language, territorial autonomy) and
the justifications for those claims (distinctiveness, consent, authenticity, and
so on). On the margins, of course, these are line-drawing questions, but liberal pluralists approach these questions in the first instance by weighing the
justifications in liberal philosophy for each group’s core claims. The hard
cases are those groups, claims, or protections that threaten to impinge on liberal values or that place liberal values in conflict with each other.30
From either the traditional or the new perspective, however, liberals
28
The terms to be used in describing the plural communities within a state are many and contested. I am using the term “multicultural” here as the broadest of those terms, to encompass
many kinds of difference within a state. However, liberal writers more frequently deploy narrower terms such as “multinational,” “polynational,” “polyethnic,” and so on, to distinguish
amongst communities as to the basis and legitimacy of their claims for protection, and to describe the subset of groups for which they would endorse such protections. “Multiculturalism,” therefore, describes the total set of communities within the state, and not the subset(s) of
groups for which one or another liberal thinker would endorse protections. See KYMLICKA,
supra note 19, at 10.
29
See id. at 75-84; Charles Taylor, The Politics of Recognition, in MULTICULTURALISM, supra
note 26.
30
See KYMLICKA, supra note 19, at 75-84.
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agree that a fundamental risk in recognizing minority group claims for cultural protections or self-government is that these communities will form illiberal enclaves that will threaten the state’s essential character as a liberal
democracy.31 For liberals, then, the limits of the state’s toleration of a minority community’s peculiar qualities and practices are set by the group’s illiberal tendencies.32 South Africa has adopted a version of the liberal pluralist
approach. Its constitution protects minority languages, cultures, and religions and recognizes the authority of tribal governments, but its constitutional
court has consistently held that the constitution’s individual liberties trump
these minority group protections, so that, for example, traditional inheritance
rules cannot be applied to disfavor women.33
c. Communitarianism
Communitarians such as James Tully argue that liberal values should be
only one of many sets of values in a robust constitutional democracy.34 Beginning with the two premises endorsed by liberal pluralists (that liberal
constitutional states endorse a particular set of cultural values, and that individuals perceive the value of their choices and exercise their autonomy

31

Id. at 75. A second, inter-related risk is to the unity of the state. If the liberal democratic
state is held together by a common faith in liberal democratic values, the illiberal values of
some communities undermines state unity. See KUKATHAS, supra note 27, at 98.
32
This is, of course, not the end of the argument. For a discussion of the details of this ongoing debate between traditional liberals (Liberalism I) and new liberals (Liberalism II), see
TIERNEY, supra note 25, at 51-68. Kymlicka, Taylor, and the rest disagree sharply not only
on line-drawing, but also on vital questions of the basis for discerning the character of particular claims, whether some groups can call upon foundational principles of the liberal state to
reconcile their claims with liberal ideals and compel their recognition, and whether it might in
some instances be appropriate for liberal democratic states to recognize certain minority
group claims in spite of the concomitant risk or reality of illiberality, but without reaching
consensus on these issues. See KYMLICKA, supra note 19, at 94-101; Chandran Kukathas,
Cultural Toleration, in ETHNICITY AND GROUP RIGHTS 72-78 (Ian Shapiro & Will Kymlicka
eds., 1997) (comparing but not endorsing the views of John Rawls, Will Kymlicka, and Deborah Fitzmaurice).
33
See S. AFR. CONST.; Shibi v Sithole and Others, 2005 (1) BCLR 1 (CC) (S. Afr.).
34
While Kymlicka and Taylor are at times identified as communitarians by traditional liberals, they straddle the gap between the traditional liberal and communitarian positions. The
line I draw between liberal pluralists and communitarians is whether the theorist uses core
liberal values as the ultimate test: liberal pluralists insist that minority communities must cede
at least to certain core liberal values; communitarians do not. See Charles Taylor, The Politics of Recognition, in MULTICULTURALISM, supra note 26, at 60 (“Even pluralist models of
liberalism do call for the invariant defense of certain rights, of course. There would be no
question of cultural differences determining the application of habeas corpus, for example.”).
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within the cultural values established by their communities), Tully and other
communitarians argue that constitutional democracy should not center on individual rights or on participation in a constitutional order that is preconceived as privileging a certain set of liberal rights. Rather, for a constitutional order to be legitimate, all the communities35 within the state must be
true constituents of the state, in the sense that their preferences as to how the
state should be constituted and organized must be incorporated into the state
order.36 Inevitably, this will produce a non-uniform order, as communities
will have different preferences.37 Sanctifying liberal rights over other rights
and interests preferred by minority communities thus undermines the legitimacy of the democracy for those communities.38 For communitarians, therefore, not liberal values but authenticity is the touchstone, and not tolerance
or assimilation, but incorporation (at least, to the extent desired by the community) is the goal.39
However, since most individuals are members of multiple communities,
and since each of those communities is likely to have at least slightly different preferences,40 the difficulty for communitarians, as for liberals, is determining which communities to privilege. Because community values will inevitably and frequently come into conflict, particularly when extruded from
the community and incorporated into the state as a whole, the hard cases, for
communitarians, are those that require either/or, irreconcilable choices between community preferences that “conflict violently in practice.”41 In making such choices, communitarians use criteria such as authenticity and continuity of community traditions, criteria that overlap with liberal pluralist
35

For a discussion of the competing definitions of community for purposes of communitarian
theory, including geographical and kin communities, perceptions of the common good, and
shared interests, see KUKATHAS, supra note 27, at 168-78.
36
See JAMES TULLY, STRANGE MULTIPLICITY: CONSTITUTIONALISM IN AN AGE OF DIVERSITY 56 (1995).
37
See id. at 55-56.
38
See id. at 86-89.
39
Id. at 5-6.
[C]ulture is an irreducible and constitutive aspect of politics. . . . if the cultural
ways of the citizens were recognised and taken into account in reaching an
agreement on a form of constitutional association, the constitutional order, and
the world of everyday politics it constitutes, would be just with respect to this
dimension of politics. Since the diverse cultural ways of the citizens are
excluded or assimilated, it is, to that extent, unjust.
Id.
40
See KUKATHAS, supra note 27, at 177.
41
TULLY, supra note 36, at 6.
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concerns, especially in so far as they tend to favor the groups also favored by
the liberal pluralist typology, namely indigenous groups followed by other
national minorities.42 Ethiopia has adopted a version of the communitarian
approach: recognized ethnic groups have the constitutional right to cultural
protections, self-government, and even secession, and the question of
whether liberal rights also protected by the constitution must be enforced
within self-governing communities has not yet been decided.43
d. Common Elements
While these three theories differ in their answers to questions of the
content, scope, and mechanisms of minority rights that can best ensure a minority group’s effective and appropriate participation in a democracy, there
are several notable commonalities to all three theories. All three presume
that the state in question is fully democratic, with an interest in promoting
liberal values.44
And all three (the liberal pluralists and communitarians especially, but
also, to a lesser extent, the classic liberals), rely on the mechanism of categorizing groups into a typology as a means of describing and, to some extent,
determining and justifying, the nature of their claims vis-à-vis the state. In
particular, national minorities and indigenous groups are understood to
have—and, importantly, to be justified in having—different kinds of rights
and interests than immigrants or other minority groups.
However, there is also an area of significant divergence: whereas classic
liberals tend to characterize the role of the state as being one of protection of
and non-interference with pre-determined liberal rights, liberal pluralists and
communitarians call upon the state to engage in a mutual dialogue with minority groups as a means of determining an acceptable balance between state
and minority interests. James Tully, for example, invokes a “post-imperial
dialogue on the just constitution of culturally diverse societies,” while Will
Kymlicka contends that the fundamental “[r]elations between national
groups should be determined by dialogue” rather than by forcible imposition
of liberal values.45 Like other aspects of these theories, this call for dialogue
has come to play a central role in the framework of minority rights deployed
by national human rights institutions and expressed in international law.
42

See id. at 138.
See ETH. CONST. art. 39.
44
Will Kymlicka, Preface & Acknowledgments, in CAN LIBERAL PLURALISM BE EXPORTED?
xii (Will Kymlicka & Magda Opalski eds., 2001) [hereinafter LIBERAL PLURALISM].
45
TULLY, supra note 36, at 24; KYMLICKA, supra note 19, at 171.
43
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ii. In International Law
The concepts and categories espoused by theorists and in national law
are reflected and further developed in international and regional treaties that
address minority rights. In international law, as in democratic theory and
state practice, the core minority rights are those that are identifiably individual and liberal and that form an integral part of the human rights canon. The
prohibition of discrimination and the rights to practice one’s religion, use
one’s language, and enjoy one’s culture without interference from the state
are well established in positive law and are accepted by most states, at least
in principle.46 While they tend to operate for the benefit of minority groups,
only the cultural rights are defined by reference to minority status; otherwise, the rights accrue to everyone and not solely to designated groups. Although these rights, particularly the cultural rights, are by their nature exercised together with others rather than alone, they are often understood to be
enforceable in court by individuals rather than by the group as a whole; that
is, they are individual rather than collective.47
Beyond these well-known rights, a broader set of minority rights is
emerging in international and national law: rights of political participation as
well as autonomy, measures designed to promote substantive as well as procedural equality, and provisions designed to permit groups greater authority
to define their interests in relation to the state. If interpreted and applied expansively, as the Inter-American Commission and Court have done in a couple of cases concerning indigenous control of land and resources,48 these
new rights could come to challenge the categories of content and justiciability that characterize the core rights described above.49 But for now, access to
46

See ICCPR, supra note 21, art. 1, 26-27.
See id. arts. 26-27. The right to self-determination provides a striking contrast. While selfdetermination has been guaranteed repeatedly in international instruments, including the UN
charter, it is problematic in each of the three aspects described above: content, to whom it accrues, and its collective nature. No consensus has developed as to the scope of this right, nor
as to which groups are entitled to exercise it, and because it is a right that is understood to be
collective rather than individual, it is often treated as non-justiciable. See, e.g., R.L. et al. v.
Canada, Communication No. 358/1989, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/43/D/358/1989 (U.N. Human
Rights Comm’n 1990).
48
See Maya Indigenous Communities of the Toledo District, Case No. 12.053, Inter-Am.
C.H.R. Report No. 40/04 (2004), available at
http://www.cidh.org/annualrep/2004eng/belize.12053eng.htm (“Maya Indigenous Communities case”); Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community v. Nicaragua, Case No. 79, Inter-Am.
Ct. H.R. Report No. 79 (2001), reprinted in 19 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 395 (2002) (“Awas
Tingni case”).
49
See, e.g., ILO Convention No. 169, supra note 10; Dr. William Bradford, “Save
the Whales” v. Save the Makah: Finding Negotiated Solutions to Ethnodevelopmental Dis47
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these rights is largely defined and determined by those categories. They are
typically limited to only certain minority groups, such as indigenous peoples
or national minorities, and usually to individuals within those groups rather
than to the group collectively. Some of the most difficult minority-related
issues for national human rights institutions lurk here, at the cusp of newly
developing minority rights.
Several important recent developments have been implemented through
regionally accepted treaties focused specifically on minority rights: the International Labour Organization’s Convention No. 169 on indigenous peoples (ratified primarily by American states) and the Framework Convention
for the Protection of National Minorities (ratified solely by European
states).50 While these treaties and their precepts have been implemented primarily in certain regions, they reveal important trends in the legal framework
of minority rights that correspond to the developments in democracy theory
described above. These treaties are notable, first, for their reliance on the
typology and categories developed by democracy theorists: indigenous peoples and national minorities are entitled to their protections, while immigrants and other minorities are not.
These protections are considerable. Both conventions list extensive and
detailed rights accruing to the protected groups, beyond the general principles espoused by prior human rights treaties. For example, ILO Convention
No. 169 not only protects indigenous groups’ rights to use their traditional
lands, but also requires states to take account of their spiritual connection to
the land, traditional ownership and methods of transmitting land, and their
putes in the New International Economic Order, 13 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 155, 162-63 (2000)
(“As indigenous groups have grown more articulate in propagating human rights discourses
replete with alternative visions and repositories of rights . . . . no response has yet crystallized
into the necessary series of proscriptions and prescriptions which can be considered authoritative and widely-accepted by even the most liberal of states. . . .”).
50
ILO Convention No. 169 requires states to implement “special measures” to protect indigenous peoples and their cultures in areas as law, development, land use, and education, but it
has been ratified by a limited number of countries, most heavily in Central and South America. These rights apply only to indigenous peoples as defined by the treaty. See ILO Convention No. 169, supra note 10, arts. 1, 5; Int’l Labour Org., Ratifications,
http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/cgi-lex/ratifce.pl?C169 (last visited Feb. 25, 2006). See also
Framework Convention, supra note 5; Council of Europe, European Charter for Regional or
Minority Languages, Europ. T.S. No. 148, Nov. 5, 1992 (entered into force Mar. 1, 1998).
The Framework Convention has been ratified by virtually all European states, but it has no
equivalent outside of Europe and has not been ratified by any non-European states. See
Council of Europe, Treaty Office, Framework Convention Ratification Page,
http://conventions.coe.int (last visited Feb. 26, 2006).
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traditional use and natural resources. Not only must states permit indigenous
communities to maintain their own internal legal systems, they must also respect their methods of punishment and take account of their culture when
punishing them in state courts.51 Likewise, the Framework Convention not
only guarantees national minorities’ use of their own language privately and
upon arrest,52 but also in public areas, as well as in education and communication with the government, so long as their numbers or historical connection to the area warrant such measures.53 States must not only guarantee
equality before the law and prohibit discrimination,54 but also “promote . . .
full and effective equality between persons belonging to a national minority
and those belonging to the majority.”55 States must not only refrain from interfering with national minorities’ enjoyment of their own culture,56 but also
abstain from adopting assimilation policies and instead promote national minorities’ preservation of “essential elements of their identity.”57
It is not merely in their specificity and extent that these claimed but contested minority rights differ from older, better-accepted ones. Both conventions push the boundary of what can be treated as individual rather than collective rights. While minority community members’ rights to nondiscrimination and equality under the law are readily exercised and enforced
as individual rights, some of the interests promoted by these new treaties are,
by their nature, exercised by the community as a whole, or at least by community members in concert with one another. In particular, the specific
rights to use of land and to legal systems protected by ILO Convention No.
169 are less consonant with classic political and civil liberties, which are
held and enforced individually, and more consonant with collective rights,
whose justiciability is not universally accepted.58
It is notable, therefore, that the Framework Convention on National Minorities carefully couches its protections as accruing to individual commu51

See ILO Convention No. 169, supra note 10, arts. 8-10, 13-15, 17.
See ICCPR, supra note 21, arts. 14, 27.
53
See Framework Convention, supra note 5.
54
See ICCPR, supra note 21, art. 26.
55
Framework Convention, supra note 5, art. 4.
56
See ICCPR, supra note 21, art. 27.
57
See Framework Convention, supra note 5, art. 5.
58
But see Additional Protocol to the European Social Charter Providing for a System of Collective Complaints, Council of Europe (Strasbourg) (Sep. 9, 1995),
http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Treaties/Word/158.doc; Office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights, Fact Sheet No.16 (Rev. 1), The Committee on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights, http://www.ohchr.org/english/about/publications/docs/fs16.htm#n_20_
(last visited Apr. 7, 2006).
52
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nity members, rather than to the communities themselves.59 In so doing, the
Convention makes its mandates more amenable to enforcement in courts;
however, this approach simultaneously limits the scope and character of the
rights that can be claimed.60
The other sense in which these new rights are defined differently than
the old is in the relationship that these treaties anticipate the state will develop with its minority groups: one of mutual dialogue. In the fundamental
human rights treaties as well as classic liberalism, states are expected to respect minority groups by not interfering with them (e.g., by granting autonomy, ignoring private cultural practices, and so on) or by actively protecting
them from outside threats.61 The new conventions require the state also to
consult with indigenous and national minority groups, to interact with them,
and to grant them the right to participate authoritatively in the state, rather
than solely giving them a defined sphere of autonomy.
Thus, ILO Convention No. 169 does not merely require the state to refrain from interfering with indigenous groups’ traditional land through development, nor merely to protect indigenous groups from unwanted development by private parties. The state must also consult with indigenous
communities about state development plans that would affect them, take account of their independently determined development goals, and ensure that
they are able to participate in decision-making regarding development.62
Similarly, although less expansively, the Framework Convention requires
states to “create the conditions necessary for the effective participation of
persons belonging to national minorities in cultural, social, and economic
life and in public affairs, in particular those affecting them.”63

59

See id.
Some authors have decried the lack of direct enforcement mechanisms for these treaties.
See, e.g., David Wippman, The Evolution and Implementation of Minority Rights, 66
FORDHAM L. REV. 597 (1997) (critiquing the Framework Convention). However, the European Court of Human Rights, for example, has now taken account of a state’s ratification of
the Framework Convention in assessing its responsibilities to its minority groups. See Case
of Gorzelik and Others v. Poland, 2004-I Eur. Ct. H.R. Minority claims that are either collective or socio-economic in nature, or both, have presented challenges for national human rights
institutions. Some minority groups have complained that their interests are fundamentally
diminished by being reduced from collective claims to individual ones, and from claims for
community governance to claims for particularized protections for narrow interests. See C.C.
Tenant & M.E. Turpel, A Case Study of Indigenous Peoples: Genocide, Ethnocide and SelfDetermination, 59 NORDIC J. INT’L L. 287, 291 (1990).
61
See, e.g., ICCPR, supra note 21, art. 27.
62
See ILO Convention No. 169, supra note 10, arts. 6-7.
63
See Framework Convention, supra note 5, art. 15.
60
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These conventions entrench the liberal pluralist and communitarian calls
for dialogue in positive law, while still couching their requirements in general terms. Nonetheless, these conventions call for a complex and consultative relationship between certain minority groups and the state, one that is in
some ways far more demanding than a mere cession of limited autonomy.
As the categories and mandates of minority rights are exported to transitioning states in the form of international pressure to ratify human rights and
minority rights treaties and to include protections in their constitutions, most
new democracies have adopted one or another of these basic approaches, at
least formally. Both the state and its minority groups have begun exploring
the opportunities these legal structures present for framing and pursuing their
interests.
In this conflicted context, national human rights institutions are positioned to play an active role. In particular, the difficulties that national human rights institutions face in using the categories and other core concepts
defined in democratic theory and international law to address minority
claims reveal gaps and limits in this legal framework. But just as national
human rights institutions’ critiques expose these lapses, so also their experiences may provide the requisite information and forum for mitigating them.
II. NATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS INSTITUTIONS AND MINORITY GROUPS
A.

What Are National Human Rights Institutions?

National human rights institutions are a part of the process of democratization, the latest tool to be touted by international bodies and funded by international donors for effective enforcement of human rights on the national
level. As such, from the international perspective, they represent another aspect of the ongoing effort to export human rights norms to transitioning
states.64 At least on the formal level, this effort has been successful: more
states have established national human rights institutions in the last twenty
years than in all the time before. Virtually every national human rights institution in Africa and Latin America has been established since 1985.65
64

From the national and local perspectives, the institutions’ significance and meaning are
variable and contested. See, e.g., Mary Ellen Tsekos, Human Rights Institutions in Africa, 9
HUM. RTS. BRIEF 21 (2002); Linda C. Reif, Building Democratic Institutions: The Role of National Human Rights Institutions in Good Governance and Human Rights Protection, 13
HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 1 (2000).
65
See Tsekos, supra note 64, at 21; Lorena González Volio, The Ombudsman Institution: The
Latin American Experience, 37 REVISTA IIDH 219, 223 (2003) (Costa Rica), available at
http://www.juridicas.unam.mx/publica/librev/rev/iidh/cont/37/pr/pr9.pdf.
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In essence, national human rights institutions are independent government agencies with the mandate of addressing human rights concerns. Their
functions typically include investigating possible human rights abuses either
sua sponte or in response to complaints; issuing non-binding recommendations; organizing education, training and publicity programs; and reporting
to national legislatures and international bodies. Some institutions have jurisdiction over both government and private conduct, whereas others can review only government actions.66
National human rights institutions traditionally have been organized as
one of two major types, ombudspersons67 or human rights commissions.68
The office of the ombudsperson was originally designed to investigate government maladministration. As concern with human rights has grown, some
ombudsperson’s offices have taken on investigation of government human
rights violations under the umbrella of their general authority to investigate
government misconduct, while in other states, governments have established
ombudspersons’ offices with the specific mandate of human rights enforcement.69 There are now numerous hybrids and variations on these central
66

See Reif, supra note 64.
The office of the ombudsman originated under the Swedish monarchy in the eighteenth
century and was gradually adopted by other states. Accordingly, ombudspersons usually have
jurisdiction over only government, not private, actions. See MARNIE LLOYDD & ALEXANDER
H.E. MORAWA, EUROPEAN CTR. FOR MINORITY ISSUES, OMBUDSPERSONS AND MINORITY
RIGHTS: A SKETCH 2-3, http://www.ecmi.de/doc/ombudsman/download/Background%20Paper.pdf
(last visited Feb. 26, 2006); Linda C. Reif, The Promotion of International Human Rights Law
by the Office of the Ombudsman, in THE INTERNATIONAL OMBUDSMAN ANTHOLOGY:
SELECTED WRITINGS FROM THE INTERNATIONAL OMBUDSMAN INSTITUTE 272, 273-74, 288-91
(Linda C. Reif ed., 1999).
68
In spite of the shared name, these human rights commissions are different from the “truth
commissions” and “human rights commissions” that transitioning governments sometimes
establish to address the transitional justice problem of abuses by past regimes, such as the
Truth and Reconciliation Commission in South Africa. Transitional justice-oriented truth and
human rights commissions are temporary and typically have jurisdiction only over the prior
government, not the present one. In contrast, national human rights institutions are permanent
and have jurisdiction over the present government. As such, they serve different purposes:
transitional justice commissions aim to account for the atrocities of the past and promote reconciliation in the present, while national human rights institutions are meant to call the current
government to account in the present and promote better policies for the future. National human rights commissions are also different from the similarly named United Nations Human
Rights Commission, which is an international body addressing human rights concerns worldwide, and from both international and national non-governmental organizations that may also
have similar names. It is a human rights commission’s mandate and organization, not its title,
that determines whether it should be considered a national human rights institution.
69
See Lloydd & Morawa, supra note 67; Reif, supra note 67, at 273-74, 288-91.
67
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types—anti-corruption ombudspersons, human rights ombudspersons, and
defensores del pueblo in Central and South America—so many, in fact, that
it is now impossible to construct a rigid typology of institutions.70 The
United Nations, the international community at large, and the academic literature on the subject of national human rights institutions have all tended to
focus on national human rights commissions and to brush aside ombudspersons as subsidiary bodies that serve many of the same functions.71 This has
had two unfortunate results: a failure to take account of ombudspersons’
work in the field of human rights, and a tendency to conflate the two bodies
and their numerous hybrid entities, inaccurately subsuming them all into the
single model of the classic human rights commission and ignoring the numerous variations that exist in mandate and function.72
70

See LINDA C. REIF, THE OMBUDSMAN, GOOD GOVERNANCE AND THE INTERNATIONAL
HUMAN RIGHTS SYSTEM 393 (2004); ICHRP REPORT, supra note 2, at 4; Reif, supra note 64.
71
See Lloydd & Morawa, supra note 67, at 2-3.
72
Although this paper will not focus on those variations, it is important to recognize that national human rights institutions are multifarious and not singular. While they share a common
purpose and certain general attributes such as flexible, informal procedures, ombudspersons,
human rights commissions, and the hybrid human rights institutions have distinct histories
and institutional characteristics. In particular, while human rights commissions often work on
individual cases, they also investigate and make recommendations concerning systemic human rights violations on an institutional or national level. In contrast, the ombudsperson’s
core function is not to analyze and comment on broad issues in the abstract, but to resolve individual complaints. However, an ombudsperson may recognize systemic problems and recommend solutions that range from personal responses to individual petitioners to structural
changes across government institutions. Its influence, like that of the human rights commission, therefore extends beyond the limits of the immediate case to the government and nation
as a whole. Human rights commissions usually have jurisdiction over both government and
private conduct. Linda Reif notes that human rights commissions may be better suited to address human rights complaints in states that have both institutions, because they can handle
complaints “which arise in both the private and public spheres, typically enjoy a stronger arsenal of powers, are often directed to provide educational and promotional activities and employ human rights norms as an imperative aspect of their mandate.” Reif, supra note 67, at
272. They are also more likely than ombudspersons to be empowered to advise the legislature
on pending legislation or on ratification of or compliance with international human rights
treaties. See Brice Dickson, Chief Comm’r, N. Ir. Human Rights Comm’n, The Harry Street
Lecture at the University of Manchester: The Contribution of Human Rights Commissions to
the Protection of Human Rights (Nov. 21, 2002), available at http://www.nihrc.org/documents/speeches/harry_street_lecture.doc. Some states have established an individual commissioner who operates more like an ombudsperson than like a human rights commission, in
spite of the title. See Mjemmas Kimweri, The Effectiveness of an Executive Ombudsman, in
THE INTERNATIONAL OMBUDSMAN ANTHOLOGY: SELECTED WRITINGS FROM THE
INTERNATIONAL OMBUDSMAN INSTITUTE, supra note 67, at 382-85 (concerning the Tanzanian
Permanent Commission of Enquiry, since replaced by the hybrid Commission on Human
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National human rights institutions are intended to complement the work
of other government institutions such as courts, and of private institutions
such as non-governmental organizations (“NGOs”), in investigating and redressing human rights abuses. They are designed to be highly accessible to
the public by maintaining an open door policy for accepting complaints.
They are also meant to influence the government, but unlike courts, national
human rights institutions promote change by means of persuasion and have
no coercive powers.73
Specifically, the authority of national human rights institutions to remedy human rights violations usually extends only to investigation and recommendation and not to binding judgment or to direct enforcement of their
recommendations. The primary tools used by these institutions to promote
change are therefore independent, impartial inquiries; where the institution is
empowered to do so, direct mediation between the parties; and publicity, reporting, and public shaming.74 Some institutions do, however, have standing
to bring disciplinary actions, lawsuits, or other proceedings against government officials and entities to remedy violations of the law.75
On first consideration, these limits on judgment and enforcement seem
to represent a disturbing compromise of institutional effectiveness, perhaps
as a means of inducing states to establish human rights institutions in the
first place.76 However, the trade-off is not as stark as it may seem. National
Rights and Good Governance, see REIF, supra note 67, at 230).
73
See UNHCHR Fact Sheet, supra note 2.
74
Attitudes toward mediation differ. Most ombudspersons are obligated by their mandates to
maintain impartiality until they have completed their investigations, and thus are barred from
mediating directly between the parties, though there are a few exceptions to this rule. See
Edward Hill, The Ombudsman as Mediator: Challenges, Limitations and Opportunities in
Vanuatu, 5 INT’L OMBUDSMAN Y.B. 146 (2001).
75
See Udo Kempf & Marco Mille, The Role and Function of the Ombudsman: Personalised
Parliamentary Control in Forty-Eight Different States, in THE INTERNATIONAL OMBUDSMAN
ANTHOLOGY: SELECTED WRITINGS FROM THE INTERNATIONAL OMBUDSMAN INSTITUTE, supra
note 67, at 195, app. 3 at 217. This is particularly important in countries that limit standing to
raise constitutional challenges to certain government officials. As Lloydd and Morawa note,
this role is also vital in countries in transition, where many old laws and institutional practices
may conflict with the new constitution and where there may be a lack of institutional traditions and practices to rectify the matter. See Lloydd & Morawa, supra note 67, at 10.
76
This bears on the question often raised in human rights circles concerning the enforceability
of human rights norms: whether unenforceable or unenforced norms are valuable even in the
breach, or whether they are at times implemented even if unenforceable, and if so, why and
how. See, e.g., Oona Hathaway, Do Human Rights Treaties Work?, 111 YALE L.J. 1935
(2002). My argument is one commonly, although not universally, endorsed by ombudspersons: that the lack of enforcement mechanisms makes these institutions complementary to,
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human rights institutions operate in the context of other institutions that do
have enforcement powers, such as the courts, and they are intended to supplement, not to replace, those institutions.77
Such critiques also fail to recognize the inherent limits on the effectiveness of enforceable legal mechanisms: they are expensive, inaccessible, and
slow, and therefore often go unused. For everyday claims, a national human
rights institution offers a swift means for an individual to get behind the
walls of bureaucracy and have her complaint considered by the otherwise inaccessible officials who have the authority to remedy her concern. National
human rights institutions have also been effective in certain controversial,
high-profile cases precisely because their investigations do not present as direct and immediate a threat to governments as they would if their conclusions were enforceable.78 In Malaysia and Togo, for example, national human rights institutions have investigated politically sensitive allegations of
severe government abuse, and their conclusions and recommendations have
revealed and challenged otherwise untouched and seemingly untouchable
government policies and practices.79 It is up to other forces in society to pick
up the gauntlet thrown down by the national human rights institution, and to
provide the pressure necessary to back the institution’s call for change.
Thus, the appropriate comparison in many cases is not between the enforcement mechanisms available through a court and the lack of mechanisms
available to the human rights institution, but between having human rights
claims evaluated through some process, even if only advisory, or not having
them addressed at all. This being the case, national human rights institutions
represent an important potential resource for all those who have human
rights-related claims, including minority groups.
B.

Minority-directed Programs

National human rights institutions report work on a wide range of human rights issues, including police and military brutality, repression of political opposition, government corruption, and prison and detention condi-

and at times even more effective than, courts and other binding means of enforcing human
rights.
77
Also, obstruction of the ombudsperson or failure to follow her formal recommendation is a
punishable offense in some states, even if the ombudsperson lacks enforcement power of her
own. See Volio, supra note 65, at 24.
78
But see Vijayashri Sripati, India’s National Human Rights Commission: A Shackled Commission?, 18 B.U. INT’L L.J. 1, 30-31 (2000).
79
See ICHRP REPORT, supra note 2, at 26, 63.
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tions, among many others.80 But although most transitioning states are ethnically divided, and in spite of the developing framework of minority rights in
international and national law, many national human rights institutions do
not report any work on minority group issues.81 However, there are regional
patterns in the existence of such programs, and there are also identifiable
trends in their scope and content.82
i. Regional Trends
There are striking regional differences amongst those national human
rights institutions that do describe themselves as working with minority
groups. In Africa, where many states have an extreme diversity of ethnic
groups, ethnic identification is often strong, and conflicts between groups are
not uncommon, there were reports of only nine states whose national human
rights institutions had made some effort to address minority concerns.83
80

See Reif, supra note 64, at 38-61.
There may, of course, be a gap between publicly reported activities and actual activities. If
so, at a minimum these institutions do not view it as being to their advantage to advertise their
work with minority groups. The case studies and interviews reviewed during this research,
however, tend to confirm these results. See, e.g., Proceedings of International Ombudsman
Institute Quebec Conference (Sept. 7-9, 2004) [hereinafter Notes on IOI Quebec Conference]
(notes on file with author).
82
These findings are based on three lines of research: a study of the public reports of national
human rights institutions’ work with minority groups; a review of case studies of individual
national human rights institutions and minority communities; and interviews and participation
in public discussion with individual ombudspersons and commissioners. Included were all
national human rights institutions that could be identified in the records of international and
regional organizations that interact with those institutions, as well as local and regional institutions that indicated some work with minority groups, and specialized institutions focused on
minority groups or on issues of racism or discrimination. Many of the interviews and discussions cited in this article took place in person at the International Ombudsman Institute meeting in Quebec City, Quebec in September 2004. Other interchanges with ombudspersons and
commissioners took place by phone and e-mail. Notes for all interviews, communications,
and country data are on file with the author.
83
These included: Ghana, Kenya, Madagascar, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Togo,
Uganda, and Zambia. See ICHRP REPORT, supra note 2 (focusing on Ghana’s Commission
on Human Rights and Administrative Justice); Report of Madagascar to the Committee on
the Elimination of Racial Discrimination ¶¶ 114-15 (Dec. 30, 2003), http://www.unhchr.ch/
tbs/doc.nsf/(Symbol)/CERD.C.476.Add.1.En?Opendocument; NAT’L HUMAN RIGHTS
COMM’N OF NIGERIA, 2003 STATUTORY REPORT OF THE NATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS
COMMISSION FOR THE YEAR 2003, http://www.nigeriarights.gov.ng/statu.html (last visited Feb.
27, 2006); NIGERIAN PUB. COMPLAINTS COMM’N, 2003 ANNUAL REPORT (on file with author);
Uganda Human Rights Comm’n, www.uhrc.org; South Africa’s Human Rights Comm’n,
http://www.sahrc.org.za (last visited Feb. 25, 2006); South Africa’s Public Protector,
81
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There was a wide range in the nature and effectiveness of these efforts, ranging from Togo’s Human Rights Commission’s appointment of a single local
chief as a commissioner to the Ugandan Human Rights Commission’s national campaign against racism, investigations into unlawful arrests and detentions of Muslims and refugees, efforts to reach minority groups through
use of local languages, and intervention in a violent inter-ethnic conflict.84
However, reporting by and concerning African institutions is limited and inconsistent.85
In South and Southeast Asia, ten general national human rights institutions identified some programs addressing minority concerns, and two states
also reported developing separate, specialized minority institutions.86 Some
http://www.publicprotector.org (last visited Feb. 25, 2006); South Africa’s Comm’n for the
Rights of Cultural, Religious & Linguistic Communities, http://www.crlcommission.org.za (last
visited Feb. 25, 2006); HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, PROTECTORS OR PRETENDERS? GOVERNMENT
HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSIONS IN AFRICA (2001), http://www.hrw.org/reports/2001/africa/contents.html [hereinafter AFRICAN HRC REPORT] (focusing on human rights commissions in Kenya, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Togo, Uganda, and Zambia).
84
See Uganda Human Rights Commission, supra note 83; AFRICAN HRC REPORT, supra note
83; cf. La Commission Nationale des Droits de l’Homme du Togo, http://www.cndh-togo.org/
(last visited Feb. 25, 2006).
85
Of 64 identified national human rights institutions in Africa, this study was able to obtain
primary information reported by the institutions themselves on minority-related activities or
detailed secondary information from non-governmental organizations, scholars, and similar
sources focusing specifically on such issues for only 34. The lack of empirical data about
human rights practices in Africa has been noted by other scholars. See Bonny Ibhawoh, Between Culture and Constitution: Evaluating the Cultural Legitimacy of Human Rights in the
African State, 22 HUM. RTS. Q. 838, 840 (2000). I found African institutions in particular less
likely to make information available over the internet, less likely to report regularly to regional and international institutions, and less likely to be the subject of scholarly reports than
institutions in other regions. Even when secondary reports noted work on discrimination or
other minority related issues, these were rarely noted by the institutions themselves. See, e.g.,
Ghana’s Comm’n on Human Rights and Administrative Justice website,
http://www.chrajghana.org (last visited Feb. 26, 2006); Kenya’s National Human Rights
Comm’n website, http://www.knchr.org (last visited Feb. 26, 2006).
86
These were the Taiwan Control Yuan, the Parliamentary Commissioner for Human Rights
of Uzbekistan, and the Human Rights Commissions of Fiji, Korea, Malaysia (Suhakam),
Mongolia, Nepal, Pakistan, the Philippines, and India. India also has three specialized commissions on minority issues, and Singapore has a Presidential Council on Minority Rights.
See Taiwan Control Yuan promotional booklet (on file with author); Report of Uzbekistan to
the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, ¶ 51 (27 Dec. 1999),
http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/(Symbol)/CERD.C.327.Add.1.En?Opendocument; Report
of Fiji to the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, ¶¶ 35-36 (Aug. 7,
2002), http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/(Symbol)/CERD.C.429.Add.1.En?Opendocument;
Report of Korea to the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, ¶¶ 23-25 &
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institutions have been noted for occasional high profile inquiries into riots or
violent police abuse (or for their failure to inquire into such matters), while
others have received attention for addressing conflicts between religious
communities.87 While the available studies of individual South and Southeast
Asian institutions’ programs tend to be more detailed than those on the African programs, reporting by and concerning these institutions was nonetheless limited as well.88
In Mexico and Central and South America, roughly half of the identified
institutions reported at least some minority-directed programs and offices.89
75-76 (4 Oct. 2002), http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/(Symbol)/CERD.C.426.Add.2.En?
Opendocument; India’s National Human Rights Comm’n website, http://www.nhrc.nic.in/
(last visited Feb. 25, 2006); Human Rights Comm’n of Malaysia website,
http://www.suhakam.org.my/ (last visited Feb. 25, 2006); National Human Rights Comm’n of
Mongolia website, http://www.nhrc-mn.org/ (last visited Feb. 25, 2006); Report of Nepal to
the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination 7-8 (Jul. 30, 2003),
http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/(Symbol)/CERD.C.452.Add.2.En?Opendocument;
Pakistan’s Human Rights Comm’n website, http://www.hrcp.cjb.net/ (last visited Feb. 25, 2006);
Philippines Comm’n on Human Rights website, http://www.chr.gov.ph/ (last visited Feb. 25,
2006); Singapore’s Presidential Council for Minority Rights website, http://www.parliament.
gov.sg/Education/edu-fun-factsheet2pg5.htm (last visited Feb. 25, 2006).
87
See, e.g., Carolyn Evans, Human Rights Commissions and Religious Conflict in the AsiaPacific Region, 53 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 713 (2004).
88
Of 42 identified Asian institutions, primary or detailed secondary information could be
found for 23. Of these, ten described some minority-directed programs or investigations.
There are also a few additional human rights institutions in the South Pacific, such as Fiji’s
Human Rights Commission, which report some minority-directed programs. See Fiji’s Human Rights Comm’n website, http://www.humanrights.org.fj/ (last visited Feb. 25, 2006).
89
Of 24 identified institutions, primary or detailed secondary information was available for
17, and of these there were reports of relevant offices, officers, or programs for 13. There
were reports of specialized activities, programs, or sub-units for for the Ombudsman in Costa
Rica; for the Defensor del Pueblo in Argentina, Bolivia, Columbia, Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela; for the Procurador para la Defensa de los Derechos Humanos institutions in El Salvador, Guatemala, and Nicaragua; and for human rights commissions in Mexico, Guyana, and
Honduras. See Report of Costa Rica to the Comittee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination ¶¶ 39 & 43 (Mar. 13, 2001), http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/(Symbol)/CERD.C.384.
Add.5.En?Opendocument; Argentina’s Defensor del Pueblo de la Nación website,
http://www.defensor.gov.ar/ (last visited Feb. 25, 2006) [hereinafter Argentina website]; Bolivia’s Defensor del Pueblo website, http://www.defensor.gov.bo/ (last visited Feb. 25, 2006);
Ecuador’s Defensor del Pueblo website, http://www.dlh.lahora.com.ec/paginas/judcial/
PAGINAS/Defensoria.base.htm (last visited Feb. 25, 2006); El Salvador’s Procurador para la
Defensa de los Derechos Humanos website, http://www.pddh.gob.sv (last visited Feb. 25,
2006); Guatemala’s Procurador de los Derechos Humanos website, http://www.derechos.org/
nizkor/guatemala/pdh/ (last visited Feb. 25, 2006) [hereinafter Guatemala website]; Indymedia website, www.indymedia.org [hereinafter Indymedia website]; Nicaragua’s Procurador
Especial de los Pueblos Indígenas y Comunidades Étnicas website, http://www.visioncostena
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Without exception, these are devoted to indigenous groups: none describe
programs relating to other minority groups. However, while many institutions reported officers or sub-units dedicated to indigenous issues, in many
cases there was no additional information provided about their activities.90
For those that did report programs and not merely the existence of offices or
officers, the scope and level of activity varied considerably, from educational and promotional activities such as producing pamphlets and publishing newspaper op-eds in Bolivia and Argentina, to extensive programs investigating indigenous complaints and studying indigenous concerns in
Guatemala and Peru.91
In Canada, Australia, and New Zealand, there are offices, commissioners, and programs devoted to indigenous groups, often on the provincial level, and these report substantially more activity than their Central and South
American counterparts.92 National and regional human rights institutions in
these states have taken on high-profile discrimination cases. Human rights
commissions in Canada may be either exclusively or primarily devoted to
anti-discrimination efforts.93 The US does not have a national human rights
institution. In its local and municipal institutions, programs directed at minority groups are focused solely on anti-discrimination initiatives. The few
exceptions, as in other American states and Australia and New Zealand, are
for indigenous groups.94
.com.ni/qsomos/qsomos.htm; Peru’s Defensoria del Pueblo website, http://www.ombudsman.
gob.pe/ (last visited Feb. 25, 2006) [hereinafter Peru website]; Venezuela’s Defensoria del
Pueblo website, http://www.defensoria.gov.ve/ (last visited Feb. 26, 2006); Volio, supra note
65, at 22 (Colombia, Ecuador, Honduras, Venezeula); Ramkarran, supra note 16 (Guyana);
ICHRP REPORT, supra note 2 (Mexico); Mexico’s National Human Rights Comm’n website,
http://www.cndh.org.mx/ (last visited Feb. 26, 2006) [hereinafter Mexico website].
90
However, there was activity information available only for seven of these institutions (Argentina, Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Guatemala, Mexico, and Peru). See Volio, supra note
65, at 22; Argentina website, supra note 89; Guatemala website, supra note 89; Indymedia
website, supra note 89; Mexico website, supra note 89; Peru website, supra note 89.
91
The Argentinean, Bolivian and Peruvian activities are self-reported on their websites, supra
note 89. The Guatemalan Procurador’s activities were reported by a secondary institution,
www.indymedia.org.
92
A prominent example is the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Social Justice Commissioner in Australia. In these states, minority-directed work is frequently carried out on the
regional or local level. See, e.g., Australian Human Rights & Equal Opportunity Comm’n
website, http://www.hreoc.gov.au/ (last visited Feb. 26, 2006).
93
See David M. Tanovich, Racial Profiling and Police Practice in Canada: E-racing Racial
Profiling, 41 ALBERTA L. REV. 905, 908 (2004); Carlos Scott Lopez, Australian Immigration
Policy at the Centenary: The Quest for Control, 18 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 1 (2003).
94
See Reuel E. Schiller, The Emporium Capwell Case: Race, Labor Law, and the Crisis of
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In Europe, in contrast, programs and institutions with the primary mandate of addressing issues of race, ethnicity, and discrimination are rapidly
expanding, driven by the work of the OSCE High Commissioner for National Minorities and now by European Union requirements, in particular by
a Directive requiring member states to establish such institutions.95 Currently, all the EU member states except one report having established bodies
that promote racial and ethnic equality as part of their mandates, and most
have established special institutions or programs directed specifically at racism and ethnic discrimination.96 Finland, for example, has long had an ombudsperson for foreigners but expanded that office to serve all ethnic minorities in response to the EC Directive;97 similarly, Germany has a
commissioner for minorities;98 Sweden has an ombudsman against ethnic
discrimination;99 and Hungary has both an Equal Treatment Authority and a
Parliamentary Commissioner for National and Ethnic Minority Rights.100

Post-War Liberalism, 25 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 129 (2004). One exception is the Ombudsperson for American Indian Families in Minnesota, who works to ensure that social service agencies and officials follow the requirements of the Indian Child Welfare Act. See Ombudsperson for American Indian Families brochure (on file with author). Also, as noted
above, while the Helsinki Commission does consider some domestic human rights issues, it
does so only in connection with its primary task of monitoring the compliance of all 55 members of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe with their human rights obligations, rather than focusing primarily on U.S. human rights concerns. See Helsinki Commission website, www.csce.gov.
95
See High Commissioner on National Minorities: Ten Years of Reducing Ethnic Tensions
(Feb. 3, 2003), http://www.osce.org/hcnm/item_2_129.html; Council Directive 2000/43/EC,
art. 13, Implementing the Principle of Equal Treatment Between Persons Irrespective of Racial or Ethnic Origin, 2000 O.J. (L 180) 22, 23 (EC) [hereinafter Directive 2000/43/EC].
96
Many but not all of these entities are national human rights institutions as such. European
states also have a number of general and special national human rights institutions, apart from
those established under the auspices of the Directive. See EUR. COMM’N, DIRECTORATEGENERAL FOR EMPLOYMENT, SOCIAL AFFAIRS AND EQUAL OPPORTUNITIES, EQUALITY AND
NON-DISCRIMINATION - ANNUAL REPORT 2005, at 23-24 (2005) [hereinafter EC EQUALITY
REPORT 2005], available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/employment_social/fundamental_rights
/pdf/pubst/annualrep05_en.pdf.
97
See EUR. MONITORING CTR. ON RACISM AND XENOPHOBIA [EUMC], MIGRANTS, MINORITIES
AND LEGISLATION 17-18 (2004), available at http://eumc.eu.int/eumc/material/pub/comparativestudy/CS-Legislation-en.pdf [hereinafter EUMC REPORT].
98
See id. at 130.
99
See id. at 55.
100
See EC EQUALITY REPORT 2005, supra note 96, at 24; Lloydd & Morawa, supra note 67, at
39. Also reporting specialized institutions or programs directed particularly at minorities are:
Belgium, the Danish Institute for Human Rights, Italy, Luxembourg, Portugal, the United
Kingdom, Slovenia, and Latvia.
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These trends present an interesting counterpoint to the overall regional
patterns of institutional development. The “boom in NHRIs in the 1980s
and 1990s . . . with a handful of exceptions . . . has occurred in the South,”101
but there has not been a corresponding increase in attention to minority interests in those regions. Rather, minority-oriented programs within national
human rights institutions seem to have developed primarily in other areas: in
particular, in the new minority institutions in Europe and, to some extent, in
the Commonwealth countries of Canada, Australia, and New Zealand.102
ii. Content Trends
There are also trends in the content of programs directed at minority
groups. Many have been focused on one of two issues: the institution’s accessibility to minority group or anti-discrimination measures. Notably, both
issues are readily encompassed by the traditional, liberal minority rights that
are widely protected in both national and international law, as discussed in
part I of this article. Two other trends concern issues that fit less neatly into
traditional liberal categories: cultural claims and inter-ethnic conflicts.
a. Accessibility
A number of institutions have developed initiatives to identify potential
barriers to access for members of minority groups, and to reduce or remove
those barriers. For example, the national human rights commission in India,
which has high rates of illiteracy among certain minority groups, has
adopted informal procedures for accepting complaints rather than requiring
complaints to be filed in writing.103 Some institutions have undertaken publicity programs aimed at extending their reach beyond the urban centers into
rural communities. The Ugandan Human Rights Commission has broadcast
information over the radio in local languages in an effort to reach rural and
illiterate segments of the population.104 Representatives of the Mexican National Commission for Human Rights have visited indigenous communities
in Oaxaca, Veracruz, Chiapas, and elsewhere to solicit and accept complaints directly.105
101

ICHRP REPORT, supra note 2, at 65; see also Volio, supra note 65.
See EC EQUALITY REPORT 2005, supra note 96; Lloydd & Morawa, supra note 67.
103
See Sripati, supra note 78, at 20.
104
See Uganda Human Rights Commission website, www.uhrc.org.
105
See Jorge Madrazo, New Policies on Human Rights in Mexico, in THE INTERNATIONAL
OMBUDSMAN ANTHOLOGY: SELECTED WRITINGS FROM THE INTERNATIONAL OMBUDSMAN
INSTITUTE, supra note 67, at 337, 351-52.
102
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Another way of improving accessibility is to establish local and provincial offices. Doing so may have synergetic effects. At the most basic level,
a single national office may be geographically inaccessible to most of the
population, especially in states with substantial rural populations and poor
transportation and communication.106 In countries with numerous minority
groups, local offices are better placed to provide services directed at the particular groups in their area. While the national office of the Commission for
Human Rights and Administrative Justice in Ghana accepts complaints only
in the country’s major languages, it hires speakers of local languages for its
regional and district offices.107 Also, some institutions have hired local minority representatives for their staff, or have appointed minority community
leaders to positions among the commission or ombudsperson officials.108
At least one case study suggests that measures and programs specifically directed at local minority populations are at times effective not only
because they are objectively more accessible but in part because they signal
interest in and seriousness about addressing minority community concerns,
establishing credibility with that community, and increasing community
members’ subjective willingness to approach the institution.109 However, if
not staffed with minority community members or supported by that community, such outreach can breed suspicion on the basis of past experiences of
discrimination.110 Such programs also run the risk of cabining minority concerns to only certain offices and officers, and reducing the accountability of
the institution as a whole to minority groups.
b. Anti-discrimination
While many national human rights institutions may not make a priority
of minority concerns or report programs directed at minority groups, few
would exclude claims of affirmative government discrimination or oppres-

106

See Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Comm’n website, http://www.aihrc.org.af/
(last visited Feb. 26, 2006); Zambian Human Rights Comm’n website, http://www.sahrc.org.
za/afr_sec_main.htm.
107
See Reif, supra note 64, at 26; see also Australian Ombudsman website, http://www.ombu
dsman.gov.au/publications_information/Annual_Reports/ar2002-03/office_profiles.pdf (last
visited Feb. 26, 2006).
108
See Sripati, supra note 78, at 11-12.
109
See Shannon Adair Williams, Human Rights in Theory and Practice: A Sociological Study
of Aboriginal Peoples and the New Brunswick Human Rights Commission, 1967-1997, at 7172, 85-86, 93-95 (1999) (unpublished Masters thesis, University of New Brunswick) (on file
with author).
110
See id.; JOAN KIMM, FATAL CONJUNCTION: TWO LAWS, TWO CULTURES 27 (2004).
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sion from their mandates, at least in principle (whereas other kinds of minority claims, such as those advocated by liberal pluralists and communitarians
may or may not fall within individual institutions’ mandates).111 If an institution does report work on substantive minority claims, it is likely to be on discrimination issues. Efforts to promote this focus may well overlap with
strategies to increase accessibility: Belgium’s Centre for Equal Opportunities
and Opposition to Racism, for example, has established local antidiscrimination centers specifically to receive discrimination complaints.112
There is a striking contrast between those institutions that deal with minority issues primarily when highly publicized cases arise but are unresponsive to daily complaints, and those, like the Belgian Centre, that reportedly
work steadily on everyday claims. Carolyn Evans describes high-profile investigations of violent conflicts targeting religious minorities by human
rights commissions in the Philippines and India,113 and other commentators
note a similar focus on high-profile claims to the exclusion of daily concerns
in the work done by other Asian and South Pacific institutions.114
c. Cultural Claims
Apart from the issues of access and discrimination, a few national human rights institutions do address minority claims of the kind elaborated in
the new minority rights treaties and by liberal pluralists and communitarians:
claims for protection of particular cultural rights, for example.115 However,
such claims are pursued almost exclusively by specialized institutions whose
core mandate is work with minority groups, and who are backed by a legal
framework establishing those rights in national law. The Parliamentary
Commissioner for the Rights of National and Ethnic Minorities in Hungary,
for example, enforces the constitutionally established rights of national minorities to practice their language and culture.116 The Guatemalan Procurador
111

There are however some institutions, such as the National Ombudsman of the Philippines,
that have a very narrowly defined mandate, in this case, “to fight corruption, graft and
crimes” so that discrimination claims are cognizable only if they relate to that mandate. See
Office of the Ombudsman, Republic of the Philippines, Ombudsman Hymn,
http://www.ombudsman.gov.ph/index.php?pagename=Ombudsman%20Hymn (last visited
Feb. 26, 2006).
112
See Ctr. for Equal Opportunities and Opposition to Racism website,
http://www.antiracisme.be/ (last visited Feb. 26, 2006).
113
See Evans, supra note 85, at text accompanying notes 73-102.
114
See Shameem, supra note 15, at 662 (Fiji Human Rights Comm’n); ICHRP REPORT, supra
note 2, at 25 (Malaysian Komnas Ham).
115
For a discussion of these treaties and rights, see supra part I.
116
See Notes on IOI Quebec Conference, supra note 81. Hungary “recognizes certain minori-
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de los Derechos Humanos, which has a special division for indigenous concerns, has pursued complaints from indigenous peoples that include claims
against a beer company for making disrespectful references to the Mayan religion in its advertising and against a restaurant that denied service to a patron who was wearing indigenous dress.117
Both the Swedish and Hungarian minority ombudsman’s offices reported sharp divisions in their work between the kinds of claims brought by
different minority groups. Although indigenous groups in Sweden are entitled to sweeping cultural protections, claims from these groups were rare.
Instead, most claims were brought by members of immigrant groups concerning either discrimination or access to government social and economic
benefits.118 Similarly, the Hungarian ombudsperson reported that his work
was divided between the claims of groups recognized as national minorities—who have a long-standing connection to Hungary, are entitled to certain protections for language and culture, and represent roughly 25% of
claims—and the Roma—who have no such protections, face severe discrimination, seek socio-economic benefits from the government, and file
75% of claims.119
But minority-directed programs aimed at particular cultural practices
may well be targeting human rights violations within minority communities
rather than defending minority interests against external threats. Ghana’s
Commission for Human Rights and Administrative Justice has taken on controversial practices such as witchcraft accusations and trokosi, a form of
forced labor and slavery.120 The Mexican human rights commission has
criticized tribal courts for failing to follow due process standards.121 Other
commissions have challenged community practices such as child marriage
and reviewed procedures in local and religious courts.122 Indeed, oversight of
ties as constituent nationalities and gives them certain self-government rights.” Lloydd &
Morawa, supra note 67, at 39. In respect of these rights, the Commissioner works on new
legislation on minority protections and monitors implementation, inconsistencies, and violations. See id.
117
See Indymedia website, supra note 89.
118
See Interview with Anna Theodora Gunnarsdottir & Nils-Olof Berggren, Parliamentary
Ombudsman’s Office of Sweden, at IOI Quebec Conference (Sept. 8, 2004) (notes on file
with author) [hereinafter Gunnarsdottir and Berggren interview].
119
See Notes on IOI Quebec Conference, supra note 81.
120
See ICHRP REPORT, supra note 2, at 16-17.
121
See id. at 37-39.
122
See Amanda Whiting, Situating Suhakam: Human Rights Debates and Malaysia’s National Human Rights Commission, 39 STAN. J. INT’L L. 59, 81 n.181 (2003); Sripati, supra
note 78, at 39-40.
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indigenous communities is the sole mandate of some institutions: the Métis
Settlement Ombudsman in a Canadian regional government institution was
established in 2003 solely to hear complaints of maladministration and conflicts of interest against the General Council of the Métis Settlements, an indigenous community granted some rights of autonomy and self-government
by the Alberta government.123
d. Inter-ethnic and Religious Conflicts
Finally, in at least a few cases, ombudspersons’ offices have been established precisely to address acute ethnic or religious tensions. In Kosovo, the
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) established an
ombudsperson’s office in 1999, in the context of UN administration of the
protectorate that maintains the forced peace between Serbs and Albanians.
In 2004, it created a Deputy Ombudsperson for minority communities to address the particular needs of the Serbs living separately in guarded enclaves.124 In Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Dayton Accords mandated establishment of a Human Rights Commission made up of a Human Rights
Ombudsman to investigate human rights complaints and a Human Rights
Chamber to hear such cases.125 Northern Ireland is another example of this
phenomenon.126 Uganda’s Human Rights Commission, while not established
for the purpose of resolving ethnic tensions, is nonetheless striking for its
unusual willingness to direct programs at this problem: as mentioned above,
it has devoted enormous resources to efforts to resolve inter-ethnic violence
in the Karamoja region.127 However, such involvements are not necessarily
either neutral or beneficial for minority groups: Kenya’s Human Rights
Commission has been accused of whitewashing its account of politically123

See OFFICE OF THE MÉTIS SETTLEMENTS OMBUDSMAN, 1ST ANNUAL REPORT FOR THE PERIOD
APRIL 1, 2003 TO MARCH 31, 2003, at 1 (2004), available at http://www.metisombudsman.ab.
ca/Annual%20Report.pdf [hereinafter MÉTIS REPORT]; Métis Settlements General Council
website, http://www.msgc.ca/ (last visited Feb. 26, 2006); CATHERINE E. BELL,
CONTEMPORARY MÉTIS JUSTICE (1999).
124
Interview with Legal Adviser, Kosovo Ombudsperson’s Office (June 7, 2004) (notes on
file with author); see also Paul R. Williams, supra note 17, at 403.
125
See J. David Yeager, The Human Rights Chamber for Bosnia and Herzegovina: A Case
Study in Transitional Justice, 14 INT’L LEGAL PERSP. 44, 45 (2004). The Dayton Accord’s
mandate has since been superseded by domestic legislation.
126
See Dominic Bryan, Parading Protestants and Consenting Catholics in Northern Ireland:
Communal Conflict, Contested Public Space, and Group Rights, 5 CHI. J. INT’L L. 233, 247
(2004).
127
See UGANDA HUMAN RIGHTS COMM’N, HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE SEARCH FOR PEACE IN
KARAMOJA (2004).
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motivated violence against ethnic groups in the Coast Province and Rift Valley to absolve the government of involvement.128
e. No Minority-directed Programs
But in many states, national human rights institutions seem to play no
role in addressing minority concerns at all. This is particularly troubling in
severely divided states.129 The ethnic and religious divisions in Indonesia, for
example, are of the utmost urgency, spurring not just political opposition and
violent conflict, but even full-scale war by separatist movements far from the
capital. Nonetheless, the Indonesian National Human Rights Commission
has been criticized for having no resources directed to minority groups or
concerns, nor even any branch offices to serve the numerous groups scattered along the nation’s vast archipelago.130 Indeed, the commission has been
notoriously uninvolved in these concerns, such that activists in Irian Jaya,
where the commission has at least carried out a few high-profile investigations, regard it as essentially a “foreign institution.”131
Indonesia is not alone in this. In the most acute cases, states that are in
the grip of violent conflicts or political unrest have not established national
human rights institutions, or if they do exist, there is no information available on their activities. But in other instances—Liberia, Sri Lanka, Zimbabwe, Nepal—institutions in severely divided states do not seem to be engaged with their countries’ acute minority concerns.132

128

See AFRICAN HRC REPORT, supra note 83.
I am using the term “severely divided states” here to refer to states where ethnic or religious identities are strong and that suffer intense and at times violent conflicts between
groups, or are complexly divided, with their population splintered amongst many groups, or
both. Complexly divided states tend to be in Africa and Asia and include Indonesia, Nepal,
Nigeria, and Ethiopia, with many ethnic groups and languages. See Fearon, supra note 7.
While there is no index for the severity of divisions between groups, the Minorities at Risk
Project has developed a database of 284 politically active minorities subject to political or
violent repression. See Minorities at Risk Project, supra note 7. See generally, HOROWITZ,
supra note 12.
130
See ICHRP REPORT, supra note 2, at 28-29.
131
Id. at 33.
132
See Nepal National Human Rights Comm’n, http://www.nhrcnepal.org/ (last visted Feb.
26, 2006); Human Rights Comm’n of Sri Lanka, http://www.hrc-srilanka.org/ (last visited
Feb. 26, 2006); AFRICAN HRC REPORT, supra note 83 (follow “Liberia”); S. Afr. Regional
Poverty Network, Executive Summary of the Regional Fact-Finding Mission to Zimbabwe
(2002), http://www.sarpn.org.za/documents/d0000901/index.php. Others include Rwanda,
Burundi, Angola, Democratic Republic of Congo, Burma, Algeria, and Azerbaijan. See Minorities at Risk Project, supra note 7.
129
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III.IMPLICATIONS
A.

Factors Correlating to Minority-directed Programs

In considering whether and why national human rights institutions have
developed minority-directed programs, two factors in particular deserve consideration: international and regional legal frameworks that, to some extent,
shape national decision-making, and common political influences that are
repeatedly cited as affecting institutional choices.133
i. International and Regional Legal Regimes
a. UN Benchmarks
If what transitioning states are looking for in creating national human
rights institutions is often to gain political capital with the UN and other international institutions as much as to make strides in promoting human
rights, then it is telling that the UN benchmarks for the success of these institutions do not require them to address minority concerns. In 1993, the UN
General Assembly endorsed the Paris Principles, which set minimum standards for national human rights institutions’ functions, authority, resources,
and independence from government influence.134 The UN and other international organizations use the Paris Principles as the primary test for certifying
agencies as national human rights institutions and for judging their competence and independence.135
133

Of course, it is impossible without delving into the details of each institution’s situation to
define precisely the influences affecting their programmatic decisions. As discussed above in
parts I and II, states have adopted various legal frameworks for minority rights, and national
human rights institutions are themselves multifarious in their functions and mandates. Addressing the particulars of each institution’s setting is, however, well beyond the scope of this
article.
134
See Principles Relating to the Status and Functioning of National Institutions for Protection and Promotion of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 48/134, Annex, U.N. Doc. A/RES/48/134
(Dec. 20, 1993) [hereinafter Paris Principles]. The United Nations has supported the development of national human rights institutions since the 1960s. It has sponsored a series of international meetings of representatives of national human rights institutions, and various
guidelines and principles have emerged from these meetings, including the Paris Principles.
See UNHCHR Fact Sheet, supra note 2.
135
For example, compliance with the Paris Principles is a prerequisite for participation in the
Asia-Pacific Forum, a regional association of national human rights institutions. See Evans,
supra note 87, at 714-15. Similarly, the National Human Rights Institution Forum uses the
Paris Principles as the sole criterion for its accreditation ratings. See National Human Rights
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The Paris Principles are not designed to, and in fact do not, offer incentives for institutions to work closely with minority groups or on minority
rights. In short, although the Paris Principles do make reference to discrimination, to pluralism, and to “vulnerable groups,” their requirements can be
met without any involvement in minority issues or with minority groups at
all.136 Furthermore, observers report that UN assistance programs for national human rights institutions tend to be generic and standardized rather
than tailored to particular countries, much less to the country’s particular
minority groups.137 From the perspective of transitioning states’ interest in
demonstrating measurable progress toward establishing independent, effective human rights institutions, therefore, the UN benchmarks give them little
reason to invest in institutional capacity to address minority concerns.138
Recently, there have been indications of an increasing recognition of the
relevance of minority group interests, both within the UN and at international meetings of national human rights institutions.139 In particular, some
Institutions Forum, Explanation Note on Accreditation Status, http://www.nhri.net/default.asp?PID=276&DID=0 (last visited Feb. 26, 2006). Scholars also treat the Paris Principles as the first measure of a national human rights institution’s legitimacy, analyzing the
structure of the institution against the Paris Principles’ requirements. See Evans, supra note 87,
at text accompanying notes 8-60; Sripati, supra note 78, at 10-13; Reif, supra note 64, at 4, 24.
136
At first, it seems promising that the Principles require that the “pluralist representation of
the social forces” of a state be represented in its national human rights institutions, but minority groups are not among the examples of the relevant “social forces” listed, which instead
focus on representatives of segments of civil society. See Paris Principles, supra note 132. In
assessing compliance with this requirement, observers tend to treat it in exactly this way, describing as “broad and pluralistic” institutions whose members are drawn from a range of institutions in civil society. See, e.g., Senegal: Staffing and Appointment Procedures, in
AFRICAN HRC REPORT, supra note 83, available at http://www.hrw.org/reports/2001/africa/senegal/senegal2.html. The Paris Principles also suggest that human rights institutions
should associate with NGOs that, among other things, work with vulnerable groups and that it
should promote human rights by, among other things, publicizing efforts to end race discrimination. But these proposals each come as the last in a laundry list of possible subjects for
publicity and association, and do not require the institutions to take any particular steps or to
advance any programs of its own. See Paris Principles, supra note 134. The Paris Principles
are a limited tool in other respects as well. See REIF, supra note 70, at 394. Case studies suggest that the Principles’ markers of independence do not necessarily correlate with effectiveness. See Evans, supra note 87, at 713 n.33; ICHRP REPORT, supra note 2, at 3.
137
See Tsekos, supra note 64, at 22.
138
Indeed, to the contrary: in order to gain the hoped-for economic and political benefits for
compliance with international norms, states must put the limited resources they are willing to
allocate to national human rights institutions into the UN-identified agenda.
139
See, e.g., Sixth International Conference for National Institutions for the Promotion and
Protection of Human Rights, Copenhagen Declaration, ¶¶ 1(b), 3(b)-(d) (Apr. 13, 2002),
available at http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu2/copendec.htm; UNHCHR Fact Sheet, supra
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of the declarations that have emerged from these meetings have acknowledged the tensions between minority groups and human rights claims, by
raising the issue of how and to what extent human rights should be adapted
to local cultures, at times gingerly and at times with a sense of grievance
against cultural imperialism, but without reaching any consensus on the
question.140 These developments highlight another fundamental limitation of
the Paris Principles: the document’s approach is both formal and formulaic,
taking the legal texts of human rights instruments as its foundation, treating
the content of human rights as unproblematic, and viewing the promotion of
human rights as a one-way transfer of these values from the UN system to
receptive national governments. As such, it lacks any contextual framework
acknowledging the variety of national and ethnic settings in which national
human rights institutions operate or the potential for the institution to be
caught in conflicts between human rights-defined interests.141
b. Regional Institutions
In contrast, it is notable that the most dramatic shift toward minority
concerns, the establishment of programs and institutions for minority groups
in Europe, has been driven by precisely the opposite legal reality: Directive
2001/43/EC on racial and ethnic discrimination requires states to establish
independent institutions to assist with complaints, carry out surveys, and
provide reports and recommendations on combating discrimination.142 This
is not a mere suggestion to member states. States must report on their progress in implementing the directive at regular intervals, and they can ultimately be brought to the European Court of Justice and ordered to pay dam-

note 2. In addition, the United Nations has also established a Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues, which is the first such body to have direct indigenous representation amongst its
members, and which has commented on the work of national human rights institutions,
among other matters. See United Nations Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues website,
http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/unpfii/index.html (last visited Apr. 7, 2006).
140
See Fifth International Workshop for National Institutions for the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, Rabat Declaration, ¶¶ 6-8 (Apr. 15, 2000), available at http://www.unh
chr.ch/html/menu2/rabatdec.htm; World Conference on Human Rights, Bangkok Declaration,
¶¶ 7-11, 22-23 (Apr. 7, 1993), available at http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu5/wcbangk.htm#I.
141
At a very basic level, the Paris Principles refer solely to discrimination and particularly to
“racial discrimination,” ignoring the many other minority interests that national human rights
institutions may need to address. See Paris Principles, supra note 134.
142
See Directive 2000/43/EC, supra note 95; see also Council Directive 2000/78, Establishing
a General Framework for Equal Treatment in Employment and Occupation, 2000 O.J. (L 303)
16-22 (EC); EUMC REPORT, supra note 97.
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ages for failure to comply.143 In addition, the European Union has set high
standards in minority protections for countries seeking entry to the Union.
In order to gain the economic, political and social benefits of accession, candidate countries are meeting the EU standards both with substantive guarantees for their minorities and with human rights institutions designed to ensure them.144
The demands of other regional human rights institutions and systems,
such as the Inter-American Human Rights system and the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, for national human rights institutions to
address minority issues are more limited and indirect.145 In Mexico and Central and South America, where the only reported work with minority groups
is solely with indigenous groups, there may be some correlation between
ratification of the ILO Convention No. 169 on indigenous peoples (a convention dominated by Latin American states) and the likelihood that a national human rights institution will report a program or office directed at indigenous groups.146 While the convention is not enforced by punitive
measures, the ILO does make general observations on states parties’ implementation of the treaty.147
In contrast, the African human rights system does promote some minority and indigenous rights in principle but does not require member states to
143

See Treaty Establishing the European Community arts. 226-28, Nov. 10, 1997, 1997 O.J.
(C340) 269-76, available at http://www.europa.eu.int/eur-lex/lex/en/treaties/dat/11997M/htm/
11997M.html#0145010077.
144
See Presidency Conclusions, Copenhagen European Council 13 (June 21-22, 1993), available at http://ue.eu.int/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/72921.pdf#search='SN%2F18
0%2F1%2F93.
145
While the Inter-American Human Rights Commission and Court have issued notable opinions affirming indigenous rights, these have not been directed at national human rights institutions. See Maya Indigenous Communities case, supra note48; Awas Tingni case, supra note 48.
146
Of the twelve states in the region that have ratified the convention and have identified national human rights institutions, nine reported some minority-directed programs (two did not,
and there was one for which no information was available on minority programs or otherwise). Of the seven countries that have not ratified the convention, two reported minoritydirected programs (one did not, and there were four for which no information was available).
In light of the lack of reporting from non-states parties to the Convention, it is difficult to tell
whether ratification correlates to programs, reporting, or neither one. The ILO Convention
No. 169 on indigenous rights is dominated by central and south American states in two
senses: the majority of states parties to the treaty are Central or South American, and many of
the states in Central and South America are parties. See Int’l Labour Org., Convention No.
169 Was Ratified by 17 Countries, http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/cgi-lex/ratifce.pl?C169 (last visited Feb. 26, 2005).
147
See Int’l Labour Org., List of Conventions, http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/english/convdisp1.htm
(last visited Feb. 25, 2006).
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establish national human rights institutions to address these issues, much less
enforce such requirements with punitive mechanisms.148 In the Asian and
Pacific regions, which lack regional frameworks for minority protections,
national approaches vary, and regional concerns play no apparent role.149
ii. Limited Political Purposes and Resources
For are a number of political and institutional reasons, a national human
rights institution might not wish to involve itself with minority concerns. In
some cases the political purpose for establishing a national human rights institution has been to forestall criticism of human rights practices with a
toothless institution, so that the last thing decision-makers want is to make
the institution more accessible or effective.150 As one Ugandan observer
pointed out, “even [Idi] Amin had his own human rights commission.”151
While national human rights institutions are officially empowered to
carry out investigations against their governments, some lack the institutional clout or resources to do so. A number of national human rights institutions do not exercise the far-reaching powers they possess on paper but
limit their activities primarily to less controversial and less resourceintensive educational programs and public awareness campaigns.152 Furthermore, an institution may face a truly daunting array of human rights
abuses by its government, so that minority concerns, however serious and
fundamental, may simply not be its highest priority. Even if such an institution is operating in good faith and receiving government cooperation, it may
be still in the early stages of institution-building, lacking the capacity for extended projects or programs.153
148

See African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights arts. 26, 45; Inter-American Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. In Asia, the only regional support for the
development of national human rights institutions is a voluntary association, the Asia-Pacific
Forum. See Asia-Pacific Forum website, http://www.asiapacificforum.net/ (last visited Feb.
26, 2006).
149
Of course, these results do not indicate whether it is state interests that are driving the development of regional systems or vice versa. Once in place, however, regional enforcement
mechanisms may create independent incentives for state behavior that take on a life of their own.
150
See Reif, supra note 67, at 278; Whiting, supra note 122, at 75-96 (Malaysia).
151
See Uganda: Assessment, in AFRICAN HRC REPORT, supra note 83, available at
http://www.hrw.org/reports/2001/africa/uganda/uganda5.html (quoting James Otto, Secretary
General of Human Rights Focus, an Ugandan NGO).
152
For example, as of 2000, the Benin Human Rights Commission had primarily carried out
trainings and workshops. See AFRICAN HRC REPORT, supra note 81.
153
See Marten Oosting, The Ombudsman and His Environment, in THE INTERNATIONAL
OMBUDSMAN ANTHOLOGY, supra note 67, at 1, 8-9.
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As one would expect, it is states with greater resources, both financial
and political, whose national human rights institutions tend to have established more elaborate and extensive programs, including programs aimed at
minority groups. Thus, for example, although Australia’s indigenous population is relatively small, it has designated a human rights commissioner to
promote the rights of its aboriginal people.154 In contrast, in Malaysia, where
society is polarized along ethno-religious lines and these differences are built
into the basic structures of government, the Malaysian Human Rights Commission has no commissioner dedicated to these issues. Rather, it has kept
silent when faced with complaints of infringement of religious rights, limiting itself to private hearings and occasional neutral statements urging interfaith dialogue.155 Indeed, in some cases there tends to be an inverse relationship at work: the more central and significant minority concerns are to a
state, the more resources and political clout it would take to address them,
and so the less likely they are to be addressed.156
Some limitations may relate to the national human rights institution’s
identity as a national, government entity. Although its mandate may be investigation of government abuse, it is nonetheless structured by and for the
purposes of the government. A national institution, located in the capital
city and created by national authorities, may not have an understanding of or
sympathy for minority views, especially as such concerns are held by distant,
rural populations and particularly as they implicate other government interests. By the nature of the appointment process, the members of national
human rights institutions are likely to be urban political and social elites with
development-oriented agendas that view minority concerns as ultimately
subservient to the greater good of the state interest in economic and social
progress. In short, the national human rights institution may well be a political or national agent—whether by political motive or merely as an effect of
its members, structure, and overall design—rather than a neutral body in interactions with minority groups.157
154

See Australian Human Rights Comm’n website,
http://www.hreoc.gov.au/social_justice/index.html (last visited Feb. 26, 2006).
155
See Evans, supra note 87, at text accompanying notes 61-72.
156
The International Council on Human Rights Policy has also noted this dynamic in its review of the work of national human rights institutions in general. See ICHRP REPORT, supra
note 2, at 1.
157
The process of appointing commissioners is typically undertaken by the central government. In assessing the plurality of those appointments, a premium is placed on consultation
with, and representation of, civil society, not regional or minority interests. See, e.g.,
AFRICAN HRC REPORT, supra note 83. See also Lisa Statt Foy, A First Nations Ombudsman:
Some Considerations, 7 INT’L OMBUDSMAN Y.B. 76, 78 (Linda Reif ed., 2003).
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Finally, beyond these questions of institutional identity and political involvement, the institution may also face tensions within its mandate. As
mentioned above, the mandates of these institutions vary widely, ranging
from narrow functions of reviewing acts of maladministration by particular
public agencies, to broad mandates to promote human rights, to a focus primarily on discrimination issues or on a particular minority community.158 As
discussed below, where conflicts arise between communities that are both
considered minority groups, or when conflicts could be characterized either
in terms of human rights or in economic, political, or social terms, a national
human rights institution may find human rights concerns and values on all
sides of a conflict.
Without becoming mired in an analysis of the formidable financial and
political difficulties that national human rights institutions functioning in
transitional states face, there are certainly reasons enough that these young
agencies might not yet be ready or able to take on the complexities of minority group claims. But when national human rights institutions do nonetheless grapple with minority concerns, their experiences are revealing.
B.

Implications for the Minority Rights Framework

National human rights institutions’ limited involvement in minority
concerns can be explained at least in part by the failures of resources, of political will, or of relevant regional incentives discussed above. But this pattern may signal something else as well: that the current understandings of
minority rights are not entirely applicable in the places they are being ignored. Echoing Leslye Obiora, perhaps “what is often mistaken for apathy
might actually be the most poignant commentary on the limitations of the
approach.”159 At a minimum, this pattern ought to spur us to consider what
limitations there may be on the direct transplantation of minority rights as
understood through the lens of democracy theory.
In severely divided states, the relationships between ethnic and religious
groups are fundamental to the nature and stability of the state. Accordingly,
the decisions that a newly developing state makes about how to accommodate those groups in its legal and political system are among the most important for its success, and for its survival.

158

A survey of the mandate of each national human rights institution is well beyond the scope
of this study; however, the salience of this concern is evidenced by the ongoing debate
amongst these institutions concerning the actual and desirable scope of their mandates.
159
See L. Amede Obiora, “Supri, supri, supri, Oyibo?”: An Interrogation of Gender Mainstreaming Deficits, 29 SIGNS: J. WOMEN CULTURE & SOC’Y 649, 656 (2003).
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But do the theories formulated in the distant contexts of well-established
and less-divided states provide a good framework for managing multiculturalism within new democracies? The theorists themselves offer only highly
qualified responses to this question,160 and critics have pointed to extensive
social, political, economic, and historical differences as discrediting efforts
to apply these theories out of their original context.161
The experiences of national human rights institutions in their work with
minority groups suggest we should reconsider two key aspects of the minority rights framework: the current identification of the core interests of the
state with liberal rights and the typology of minority groups. National human rights institutions have also struggled to address two particularly problematic situations: collective group interests and indigenous legal systems.
i. Core Interests of the State
Although each of the theorists discussed in part A above came to different conclusions about the proper balance of liberal and minority rights within
the state, all “took for granted” (as Kymlicka puts it) in staking their positions, that the state in question was a well-established liberal democracy and
that the fundamental tension to be resolved in considering minority claims
was that between those claims and the liberal values at the core of the state’s
identity.162 Here, the views of national human rights institutions suggest that
democracy theory may overstate both the extent to which liberal rights are
the core interest that the state wishes to protect and with which it identifies,
and also the extent to which the central challenge posed by minority groups
is illiberality. When ombudspersons from around the world were invited to
characterize minority interests, they began with classic liberal restatements
of minority interests as extensions of liberal interests, such as: “the Ombudsman’s traditional role of protecting citizens from excesses in government power means that we have particular responsibilities towards those

160

See, e.g., Kymlicka, supra note 44, at xii; Will Kymlicka, Nation-Building & Minority
Rights: Comparing Africa and the West, in ETHNICITY AND DEMOCRACY IN AFRICA 54, 54
(Bruce Berman, Dickson Eyoh & Will Kymlicka eds., 2004) [hereinafter ETHNICITY AND
DEMOCRACY].
161
See, e.g., Will Kymlicka, Reply and Conclusion, in LIBERAL PLURALISM, supra note 44, at
347-48 (summarizing Central and East European scholars’ critiques of his position, including
concerns about the role of elites in defining minority interests, oppressive minorities, and
risks to the process of democratic development); Kymlicka, supra note 160, at 64 (considering African scholars’ critiques, including fundamentally different patterns of ethnic groups
and interactions).
162
Kymlicka, supra note 44, at xii.
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who are vulnerable or marginalized.”163 But they did not end there. Instead,
the descriptions quickly shifted to other concerns: minorities’ claims to
socio-economic equity (from the Argentinean ombudsperson),164 the role of
immigration and international relations (from the Swedish and European
ombudsmen),165 and minorities’ effect on national identity (from the Greek
ombudsperson).166
These varying concerns are not surprising, in light of the diverse roles
minorities have played in the lives of states, and the differences in selfperceptions of identity amongst these states. Governments in Central and
Eastern Europe tend to view minority issues more as a national security concern than as a threat to liberal values, in light of the violent inter-ethnic conflicts there.167 In Africa, not only are national security and stability crucial
issues, but few states enforce liberal rights consistently, and while ethnic
communities flourish on the social level, in the political realm ethnicity most
often is deployed as a form of patronage.168 The European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia suggests that historical differences in patterns
of immigration have shaped not only the distribution of minorities within
states but also “public perceptions of their place in society and hence, public
policies vis-à-vis these minorities.”169 Finally, while many states, wherever
located and however constituted, have guaranteed liberal rights in principle,
no small number are all too illiberal in practice.170
Liberal and communitarian democratic theory’s misplaced presumption
that the state’s identity is liberal can be misleading when conflicts arise between minority groups and the state that are ostensibly about liberal values.
163

See Bruce Barbour, The Ombudsman and Today’s Demographic Realities (2004) (discussion paper, on file with author); see also Dr. Jenö Kaltenbach, Special Protection Requirements for Minorities: The Parliamentary Commissioner for the Rights of National and Ethnic
Minorities of Hungary, 7 INT’L OMBUDSMAN Y.B. 64, 65 (2003).
164
See Dr. Jorge Luis Maiorano, Workshop 2: Social Condition, at 7-9 (2004) (discussion paper, on file with author).
165
See Notes on IOI Quebec Conference, supra note 81 (panel session Sept. 7, 2004).
166
See id.
167
See Will Kymlicka, Western Political Theory and Ethnic Relations in Eastern Europe, in
LIBERAL PLURALISM, supra note 44, at 66-67.
168
See Emile Francis Short, The Development and Future of the Ombudsman Concept in Africa, 5 INT’L OMBUDSMAN Y.B. 56, 57 (2001); Dickson Eyoh, Liberalization and the Politics
of Difference in Cameroon, in ETHNICITY AND DEMOCRACY, supra note 160, at 96, 98-99; Peter Ekeh, Individuals’ Basic Security Needs and the Limits of Democracy in Africa, in
ETHNICITY AND DEMOCRACY, supra note 160, at 22.
169
See EUMC REPORT, supra note 97, at 6.
170
See FAREED ZAKARIA, THE FUTURE OF FREEDOM (2003); Papaioannou & Siourounis, supra
note 6.
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If applied uncritically, its principles may place too much credence in a
state’s liberal rhetoric, mistaking talk for actual devotion to those rights,
overestimating the extent to which the state actually protects liberal rights
(especially vis-à-vis its minorities), and underestimating the extent to which
the state is willing to use those rights as a weapon against minority groups
without protecting them itself. In Mexico, case studies of interactions between several indigenous groups and the Mexican government illustrate
these concerns. The Mexican government and its national human rights
commission have criticized indigenous legal systems for failing to ensure
due process guarantees in their internal legal systems.171 There is no doubt
that in fact due process norms are not followed in the communities’ courts:
they employ models of community judgment and punishment that do not
correspond to liberal ideals. But the Tlapanec, Tierra y Libertad and Zinacantán communities object to using the state’s legal system not only on
grounds of autonomy or of cultural rights, but also because the Mexican
government has itself failed to guarantee crucial elements of due process, as
when it has systematically failed to provide translators for non-Spanish
speaking defendants from their communities.172 While the Mexican government deploys the language of liberal rights in arguing that indigenous autonomy must be limited, it does so as a rhetorical tactic, inviting us to compare
indigenous realities to liberal ideals rather than, as we should, to the realities
of state interests.
As well as overestimating the importance of liberal values to the state,
democracy theorists may also overestimate the risk of minorities creating “illiberal enclaves” within the state, in the sense of deliberately creating systemic inequalities within their communities. There is an intriguing pattern in
the claims filed with certain Canadian regional institutions: while some human rights claims by tribal community members against tribal government
institutions did concern systematic gender discrimination or other systemic
problems, many complained of simple favoritism, nepotism, or abuse of
power of the barest sort. For example, most of the formal complaints re171

In one case, Mexican authorities objected to the detention of two brothers, Pascual and
Pedro Gómez Domingo, by the autonomous authorities of Tierra y Libertad for 7-10 days
while investigating complaints that they had illegally cut wood. The government viewed this
detention as exceeding human rights norms for such detentions and, more fundamentally, as
usurping state authority over criminal law. See Shannon Speed & Jane F. Collier, Limiting
Indigenous Autonomy in Chiapas, Mexico: The State Government’s Use of Human Rights 22
HUM. RTS. Q. 877, 897-900 (2000).
172
See id. at 884-85; Martin Hébert & Caroline Aubry, Linguistic Competence, Cultural
Categories and Discrimination: Indigenous People Before the Mexican Court System (forthcoming) (manuscript at 11).
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ceived by the Métis Settlement Ombudsman in 2003 regarding Métis Settlement leadership were such claims of nepotism, conflicts of interest, or
other failures of professional conduct.173 Similarly, while the New Brunswick Ombudsman did receive some complaints of discrimination against
tribal leadership, many of its complaints concerned simple abuse of political
authority to favor friends and disfavor rivals.174 While such problems are obviously undesirable, they are neither inherent to minority systems nor different in kind than the problems that arise within liberal democratic systems.
Accordingly, theorists might also be misjudging the extent to which any
human rights concerns that arise within minority communities will represent
fundamental conflicts between liberal and minority values. Because nepotism and favoritism do not implicate deeply valued community principles or
traditional practices, and indeed often violate community values and customs
as well as human rights values and customs, these claims are likely to represent, not true clashes of values, but rather, the divergence of political reality
from both sets of values, minority and liberal.175
This is not to say that there is not a risk of fundamental conflicts between liberal and minority community values, for there are myriad examples
of irreducible conflicts, the most commonly noted being entrenched gender
discrimination.176 Canadian cases could prove to be exceptional. But they do
raise the intriguing possibility that the traditional focus on liberal rights as
the point of conflict between minority groups and the state may tempt us too
often to look to fundamental differences between minority and liberal values
for the cause of conflicts, rather than considering other possibilities.
Finally, scholars tend to give short shrift to the limits on state power and
capacity that make effective enforcement of any rights, liberal or minority, a
pipe dream for many new democracies. In some states, government infrastructure has not infiltrated very far beyond the capital city, and even liberal
freedoms, well-established in principle, are at the whim of local officials.
Whether the state perceives its interests as relating to liberal rights, national
173

MÉTIS REPORT, supra note 123, at 10.
See Williams, supra note109, at 55-56.
175
In a similar vein, Makau wa Mutua argues that human rights violations by African state
leaders often are not in pursuit of alternative visions of the good but represent mere abuses of
power for power’s sake or private benefit. See Makau wa Mutua, The Banjul Charter and the
African Cultural Fingerprint: An Elevation of the Language of Duties, 35 VA. J. INT’L L. 339,
374 (1995).
176
See KIMM, supra note 110, at 18-19 (discussing violence against women in Australian
Aboriginal communities). The due process concerns raised in the Mexican examples above
also present a frequently noted conflict between liberal and minority community values that
might or might not be fundamental and irreducible, depending on the circumstances.
174
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security, or something else entirely, it may not be capable of enforcing them.
These strictures apply to national human rights institutions as well: again
and again, the institutions in transitioning states lament that they lack the
necessary funding and resources to perform their functions.177
But the implications of these limits on state resources are more farreaching than simply a practical obstacle to rights enforcement. In this context, the state may not be in a position to determine the set of rights that will
accrue to its minority community at all. Rather, minority communities in
some states are de facto governing themselves.178 Any set of rights supposedly guaranteed by the state may be utterly ephemeral, so that talking about
a conflict between liberal rights and minority rights may be an entirely theoretical debate, the human rights equivalent of theological treatises on the
number of angels that can dance on the head of a pin.179
ii. Categories of Minority Groups
In addition to mischaracterizing the primary interest of the state as a
predominantly liberal one, liberal pluralists and communitarians place too
much weight on the historicity and authenticity of the group’s relation to the
state as the basis for the legitimacy of its claims, and as the criterion for distinguishing between groups. In both theory and positive law, recognized
minority groups fall into three major categories: indigenous groups who
were once hegemonic in their territory and who were displaced by the current state or its predecessor,180 other “national minority” groups who have
177

In its review of seventeen African national human rights institutions, Human Rights Watch
noted inadequate funding as a major, and at times crippling, problem for half of them, including Benin, Chad, Ghana, Liberia, Malawi, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Uganda, and Zambia.
See, e.g., Malawi: Funding, in AFRICAN HRC REPORT, supra note 83, available at
http://www.hrw.org/reports/2001/africa/malawi/malawi5.html (noting that “[t]he major drawback for the commission is the lack of adequate funding.”); see also Short, supra note 168, at
68 (describing “inadequate resources and lack of training” as the “two main challenges facing
ombudsman institutions in Africa” and noting that “even annual budgets approved by parliament for ombudsman offices may not be met during the year.”).
178
This is the case, for example, in some areas of Ethiopia.
179
See Ivan Bizjak, Special Features of the Role of the Ombudsman in Transition Conditions,
5 INT’L OMBUDSMAN Y.B. 83, 87 (2001) (listing responses to a survey of ombudsperson’s offices in transition countries concerning “special problems” relating to transition).
180
See discussion regarding the definition of the term “indigenous,” supra note 10. Kymlicka
treats indigenous groups as a subcategory of national minority groups, but I list them here as a
separate category because they are treated separately by many other commentators and by
international law, and because Kymlicka himself regards indigenous groups as having both
unique claims and unique justifications for those claims, as compared to non-indigenous national minorities. See Kymlicka, supra note 167, at 23-31.
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long co-existed within the state,181 and new immigrant groups.182 This typology implies that differences in historical relationship are a good descriptor of
the group’s interests vis-à-vis the state, a correspondingly good predictor of
the nature of the group’s claims, and a principled basis for different treatment by the state.183 This basic typology is also expressed in the treaties and
constitutional protections for minority groups. Thus law and theory feed on
and drive each other in framing these concerns.184 National human rights institutions also work within some version of this typology, as expressed by, or
modified in, their states’ constitutions and treaty obligations.185
No one has ever claimed that this typology is perfect; advocates have
always acknowledged the existence of problem cases on the margins.186
181

While most writers would include as “national minorities” all long-standing minority
groups within the state (as I describe it in the text), some would limit this group only to splinter groups associated with other states, e.g, Greeks but not Kurds in Turkey, and Hungarians
but not Silesians in Poland. See Aukerman, supra note24, at 1027.
182
This group may be further subdivided, however, to reflect the differing claims of different
kinds of immigrants. See Kymlicka, supra note 160, at 59-61.
183
In brief, this typology focuses on distinctiveness, authenticity, continuity, and consent as
crucial characteristics determining the viability of claims for group recognition and rights.
Indigenous groups are expected to present an identity and worldview that is comprehensively
different than that of the state and to make claims focused on cultural protection through substantial territorial autonomy and control of traditional lands. The philosophical basis for their
claim is supposed to be an authentic and continuous tradition that predates and survives the
state and a lack of consent to be governed by the state. Other national minorities are anticipated to present an identity and culture that is distinct from the state’s, although not as different as indigenous groups, and to present claims primarily for protection of those distinct characteristics, and perhaps for some degree of territorial autonomy. The justification for their
claims is also described as the authenticity and continuity of their distinctive tradition, but it is
expected to be more limited in scope and more consonant with the state’s own traditions.
Immigrants are acknowledged to present identities with a wide range of levels of difference in
characteristics, but they are regarded as having abandoned claims to territorial autonomy and
to a continuous cultural tradition by virtue of their decisions to migrate to other cultures. For
a full introduction to the topic, see TIERNEY, supra note 25; TULLY, supra note 36; Kymlicka,
supra note 167.
184
See ANDREAS FØLLESDAL, Minority Rights: A Liberal Contractualist Case, in DO WE
NEED MINORITY RIGHTS? 59-60 (J. Räikka ed., 1996).
185
In Slovenia, for example, the Human Rights Ombudsman is limited in its efforts to work
on behalf of Roma and other minority communities by the constitution’s distinction between
enumerated national minority groups and other unenumerated groups, who are entitled to
lesser protections. See HUMAN RIGHTS OMBUDSMAN OF SLOVENIA, ANNUAL REPORT 2004, at
8 (2004), available at http://www.varuh-rs.si/fileadmin/user_upload/ pdf/lp/vcp_lp_2004
_eng.pdf.
186
Some groups do not fit the categories neatly: African-Americans cannot readily be characterized either as national minorities or as immigrants. Other groups fit their category neatly in

BAYLIS

114

9/11/2006

10 UCLA J. INT’L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 66 (2005)

Nonetheless, the typology has persisted, perhaps as much because it is effective in limiting the groups entitled to rights on a basis that is difficult for
them to manipulate (history), as because it is a useful or descriptive one.187
But in new democracies and severely divided societies, the problem
cases in this typology move from the margins to center stage: they are the
majority of cases instead of the few. In some new democracies the kinds of
groups that have always formed democratic theory’s problem cases have
been and continue to be more numerous and conflict-ridden than those in the
established democracies where this typology was developed. As mentioned
above, the Hungarian Ombudsman for Ethnic and National Minorities receives most of his claims from the Roma, who have long been considered a
“problem case” for the typology, as they are not readily categorized as indigenous, national minorities or immigrants, nor do their claims readily fit
the simple categories of non-discrimination, territorial autonomy, or purely
cultural rights.188 The Slovenian Ombudsman has complained vigorously
about the inadequacy of this typology for purposes of addressing minority
claims in that new state. Slovenia recognizes a certain set of “national minorities” that include neither the Roma community nor “the erased,” members of non-Slovenian ethnic groups who have lived in Slovenia since it was
part of the former Yugoslavia and whose identities were summarily erased
by the government in 1992.189
Furthermore, in many African and Asian states, many or all ethnic
groups might equally lay claim to national minority or indigenous status.190
In such states, this characteristic provides no basis for distinguishing between, limiting, or even predicting the kinds of interests that a group will
posit in its relationship to the state. Here the typology is simply irrelevant.191
a formal sense, but the reality of their circumstances belies the core characteristics of the
category nonetheless; for example, refugees, who have not chosen to abandon their own cultures and therefore do not lend themselves to the argument that they have consented to assimilation by voluntarily migrating.
187
Mark Rosen also argues that a concern with limiting the number of beneficiaries underlies
Kymlicka’s distinction between national minorities and other groups in particular. See Rosen,
supra note 18, at 823.
188
Notes on IOI Quebec Conference, supra note 81 (panel session Sept. 7, 2004).
189
See HUMAN RIGHTS OMBUDSMAN OF SLOVENIA, supra note 185, at 65-66.
190
Nigeria, for example, has several hundred ethnic groups that pre-date the colonial period
and the modern Nigerian state. See SUBERU, supra note 12, at 20; see also HOROWITZ, supra
note 12, at 202-16 (concerning the complexity of claims of indigenity in African and Asian
contexts).
191
In her analysis of minority rights in Eastern Europe, Miriam Aukerman suggests that each
category is truly descriptive only in a certain area of the world, so that groups in North and
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In severely divided societies, there are often groups with unquestionably
venerable historicity and authenticity, but who nonetheless present problematic claims. For example, the position of the formerly dominant minorities
in Eastern Europe vis-à-vis formerly dominated majorities defies the analysis
of liberal and communitarian theory. In Kosovo, the ombudsperson’s reference to “the minority” inevitably means the Serbs, with whom the majority
Kosovar Albanians were engaged in violent conflict only a few years ago,
and who were themselves the majority only a few years ago.192 Similarly, for
the human rights institutions of the Baltic states, the minority is the Russian
population, many of whom came to the region during Soviet rule.193 The
claims of once dominant national minorities to protection of the language
and culture may be formally identical to those of other national minorities in
other states, but the philosophical justifications for those claims and the political and social reaction that the ombudsperson’s offices face in addressing
them are quite different. For these severely and, at times, violently divided
societies, the question is not whether these groups have maintained authentic
and continuous traditions, but whether traditions that have been forcibly imposed by one group upon another can or should be secured thereafter.
Furthermore, it appears that the number of problem cases is increasing.
Ethnic identities persist even as internal cultural traditions are rapidly changing and being reshaped by interaction with other groups and with international influences.194 This phenomenon is of course not unique to severely divided societies. In Canada, the Métis have long presented a “problem case”
in that their ethnic heritage is a mix of indigenous and immigrant peoples.
Recently they have begun developing joint forms of governance and adjudication in cooperation with the regional Alberta government, based in part on
their own customs and in part on the customs of the state.195 In Mexico, indigenous groups have formed new local legal and political systems that mix
indigenous and non-indigenous forms of government.196 In Europe, political
lines are shifting, and ombudspersons there are increasingly receiving claims
from foreigners and migrants seeking to define and make use of changes in

South America and Oceania most neatly fit the indigenous category, which is progressively
less useful in Europe, Asia and Africa. See, e.g., Aukerman, supra note 24, at 1044-46.
192
See KOSOVO OMBUDSMAN, ANNUAL REPORT 2003 (on file with author).
193
See ULZIIBAYAR VANGANSUREN, THE INSTITUTION OF THE OMBUDSMAN IN FORMER
COMMUNIST COUNTRIES (2002).
194
See generally, HOROWITZ, supra note 12.
195
See MÉTIS REPORT, supra note 123, at 1; Métis Settlements General Council website, supra note 123; BELL, supra note123.
196
See Speed & Collier, supra note 171, at 884-85; Hébert & Aubry, supra note 172, at 1-3.
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their status as the EU consolidates, leaving them no longer immigrants, but
not national minorities or indigenous groups either.197 In complexly divided
societies with hundreds of ethnic groups, and in transitioning states engaged
in rapid processes of social and political change, these blended peoples and
systems are becoming the norm, not the exception.
Wherever groups reshape themselves and their traditions but nonetheless maintain some separate ethnic identity, they pose challenges not just to
the typology, but to the fundamental concepts of democratic theory. For
some of these groups defy easy categorization precisely because their characteristics and concerns belie the philosophical justifications that underlie
those categories. In such cases, it is hazardous to rely on authenticity or the
historical relationship of the group to the state to define the legitimacy or nature of its claims.
iii. Collective Claims
Traditionally, even those minority rights that are exercised together with
others, such as use of language or religion, have been characterized as individual rights held by members of the group. However, some collective
group interests, such as claims for socio-economic equity or intercommunity disputes, are particularly ill-matched to individual rights frameworks.198 Faced with these divergences between rights and interests, communities and national human rights institutions do not passively accept and
apply the rights structures they are presented with by the state and international institutions. Rather, they are engaged in an active process of characterizing and recharacterizing minority claims in ways that relate not only to
the letter of the law, but also to their perceptions of their mutual and conflicting interests.
One way that this occurs is that national human rights institutions and
minority groups at times choose to emphasize the individual, liberal aspects
of minority claims and minimize the socio-economic aspects, characterizing
the claims in ways that bring them within their mandate and to minimize any
197

See Gunnarsdottir & Berggren interview, supra note 118.
As discussed above in part I, while some socio-economic and equity claims are acknowledged in newer minority treaties like ILO Convention No. 169 and, to a lesser extent, the
Framework Convention for Protection of National Minorities, these conventions have been
ratified by only a limited number of states, and the Framework Convention’s protections, at
least, accrue to individuals rather than groups. Apart from these conventions, socio-economic
rights, equity claims, and collective claims are far less likely than discrimination claims or
claims for individual political and civil rights to be protected under national law or to be
found justiciable in court.
198

BAYLIS

9/11/2006

Minority Rights, Minority Wrongs

117

conflicts between the minority claims and liberal rights.199 The New Brunswick Human Rights Commission in Canada, for example, has a mandate that
is limited to discrimination claims, but has received claims from a Native
American community concerning socio-economic inequities in living conditions and economic status, claims that the community regards as representing
collective, systemic experiences of discrimination.200 Rather than treating
them as such, the institution has recharacterized some such claims as individual ones. The community, however, became reluctant to pursue claims
through the commission in part because they did not view investigating and
remedying their individual claims of discrimination against other individuals
as addressing the systemic problems they observed:
[C]ases of discrimination [are] treated as isolated events and removed from the economic and social causes of inequity. As Aboriginal critics observe, the discrimination experienced by Native
people is by its nature social, and is based on collective identities and
status. Reluctance to pursue the occurrence of discrimination in
broader social contexts owing to limited resources, narrow legislative
mandates or lack of organization will contribute to the perception
that human rights codes are impotent measures for achieving social
justice.201

Particularly where inter-ethnic socio-economic stratification is acute,
minority groups may well regard their concerns not as either cultural or liberal, but rather as a demand for equity, for a share of the tangible goods of
society.202 Here the commission’s narrowed approach could bring particular
claims within its mandate, but only at the cost of essentially mischaracteriz199

This is the case in the theoretical literature as well. See KYMLICKA, supra note 19; JAMES
ANAYA, INDIGENOUS PEOPLES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (1996).
200
See Williams, supra note109, at 51-77. That the gap remains unmitigated is reflected in a
more tangible sense as well: the harm of collective socio-economic degradation cannot be
adequately remedied through the damages associated with an individual discrimination claim.
201
Id. at 126.
202
Interviewing women in Nigeria on behalf of the World Bank, Leslye Obioria recounts that:
[Many] seemed confounded by the conceptualization of gender equality in human rights discourses. . . . they extolled respect as a more realistic paradigm for
ordering specific social relations. . . . educated, elite, and urban women were
more inclined to subscribe to an equality-based discourse, while women in rural
areas had more of a tendency to lament the paucity of resources. . . . Arguably,
the rural perspective suggests that it may be somewhat facile to quarrel over who
does the dishes after dinner when dinner is a fast-disappearing routine in many
rural households.
Obiora, supra note 159, at 652.

BAYLIS

118

9/11/2006

10 UCLA J. INT’L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 66 (2005)

ing them. This narrowed focus could not close the more fundamental gap
between the state’s way of framing the harm for which minorities are entitled to redress, discrimination, and the community’s perception of what it
had been denied by the state, economic and social equity.
In this regard the newer multilateral treaties that require the state to take
account of equity and encourage community consultation and participation
in governance seem to better capture claims such as those described by the
New Brunswick community. However, the experiences of other national
human rights institutions suggests that, while characterizing collective minority interests as rights may be feasible, it may not be a productive way of
resolving their claims.
In particular, some observers have criticized the application of minority
group rights to address disputes between communities. Dominic Bryan suggests that in Northern Ireland, the introduction of human rights standards
into inter-communal disputes has been counterproductive. The parades that
are a tradition of both the Protestant and Catholic communities frequently
present a flashpoint for conflict. While neither community originally construed its concerns as a human rights claim, the National Human Rights
Commission participated in redefining standards for parades, introducing
both individual and minority rights standards in addition to traditional security and stability concerns.203 But neither individual rights to formal equality
nor group rights to substantive equity provide criteria for choosing between
“the rights of Protestant Orangemen to follow their ‘traditional’ route and the
rights of Catholic Nationalist residents who feel threatened by what they argue is the intolerance and bigotry of the Orangemen.”204 Likewise, there are
equivalent cultural rights present on both sides of the dispute.
Bryan argues that human rights standards are effective in providing
guidelines for state behavior vis-à-vis minority groups, but not in adjudicating disputes between communities with similar rights and concerns.205
Rather than providing a basis for balancing the parties’ respective interests
and concerns, the introduction of human rights norms has merely encouraged
government agencies to “couch . . . their decision in the language of rights”
all the while “adopting a standardized boilerplate format for their determinations.”206 In this case at least, the addition of human rights standards has
merely provided another gloss on the situation, rather than a determinative
basis for distinguishing the parties’ interests or deciding between them.
203

See Bryan, supra note 126, at 241-42.
Id. at 248.
205
Id. at 249.
206
Id.
204
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Some national human rights institutions seem to have deliberately chosen not to deploy the applicable framework of minority rights in addressing
inter-ethnic and socio-economic complaints, choosing instead to frame a
dispute in other terms. As described above, the Nigerian Public Complaints
Commission has heard at least one complaint regarding employment preferences for persons who are not indigenous to the local area, but the discussion
of this complaint in the Commission’s report is rather opaque. It is only
with the knowledge of bitter and sometimes violent conflict between “indigenous” ethnic Christian minorities and the “settler” migratory Muslim
Hausa-Fulani majority, as well as other longstanding ethnic conflicts, that
this complaint of favoritism comes into relief as being one that likely concerns inter-ethnic discrimination.207 Similarly, the Nigerian Human Rights
Commission’s 1999 investigation of “human rights issues arising in connection with unrest in the oil producing [Niger Delta] region”208 may well
amount to investigation of inter-ethnic violence over socio-economic inequities and competing claims to resources between the “desperately poor”
Ogoni, Igaw, and other ethnic groups of this region, which produces 90% of
Nigeria’s oil revenues, and the dominant Igbo, Yoruba, and Hausa-Rulani
groups in the central government.209
Certainly, the Nigerian institutions’ domestic constituency is well aware
of any possible component of inter-ethnic discrimination or conflict posed
by these complaints. In situations of intense ethnic division and conflict,
even superficially neutral situations may be understood in ethnic terms. An
institution’s list of regional offices could signal sympathy with the ethnic
groups dominant in those areas; attacks on corruption in government could
amount to opposition to clientelism within a dominant ethnic group. In these
circumstances, institutions need not identify scenarios as “ethnic” or “minority” related for them to be understood as such, at least by those involved.
Some institutions view emphasizing ethnic or minority roles in such circumstances as perverse or counterproductive. The Human Rights Ombudsman
of Bosnia-Herzegovina, for example, issued a policy document arguing that
the focus on ethnicity to the exclusion of other identities was “limiting and
207

Compare NIGERIAN PUBLIC COMPLAINTS COMM’N, 2003 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 83,
with MONTY G. MARSHALL & KEITH JAGGERS, CTR. FOR INT’L DEV. & CONFLICT MGMT.,
POLITY IV COUNTRY REPORT 2003: NIGERIA, http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/inscr/polity/Nig1.htm
(last visited Feb. 26, 2006) [hereinafter POLITY IV NIGERIA REPORT].
208
See Nigeria Report, in AFRICAN HRC REPORT, supra note 83, available at
http://www.hrw.org/reports/2001/africa/nigeria/nigeria3.html.
209
See POLITY IV NIGERIA REPORT, supra note 207; MINORITIES AT RISK PROJECT, CTR. FOR
INT’L DEV. AND CONFLICT MGMT., ASSESSMENT FOR OGANI IN NIGERIA, http://www.cidcm.
umd.edu/inscr/mar/assessment.asp?groupId=47504 (last visited Feb. 26, 2006).
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hampering progress and prosperity,” and that “many individuals and groups
. . . would prefer not to have to identify themselves as Bosnjaks or Croats or
Serbs.”210
These instances suggest that current minority rights frameworks are limited in their capacity to address collective concerns and inter-community
conflicts, even if the involved communities and institutions deliberately reframe those concerns. In the Canadian and Irish experiences, the effectiveness of the available minority rights framework depended on how well it reflected the parties’ perceptions of the interests at stake and whether it
presented criteria or principles that are determinative of those interests, while
the Nigerian and Bosnian approaches suggest that the introduction of highly
contested ethnic categories is itself problematic.
As suggested above, democratic theories developed in well-established
liberal democracies may emphasize factors that are tangential in severely divided or transitioning societies, such as the historicity of a group’s claim or
the potential conflict it presents with liberal values that the state itself may
not effectively enforce. In situations of inter-community conflict, particularly where all the involved communities are “minorities” or “indigenous”
with equivalent claims of rights, these categories and the associated rights do
not present a means of distinguishing or weighing the claims presented.
But the interactions of the communities and institutions in these examples suggest something more, as well. In each of these cases, communities
and national human rights institutions consciously exploited the categories
of minority and liberal rights to frame the relevant interests as either within
or without the available rights. In so doing, they were not merely passive
recipients of rights that were pre-determined by the nature of community
identities or imposed by the good graces of the state. Rather, they participated actively in determining what would be conceptualized as minority
rights. While these rights may be fixed on paper, in reality they seem to be
relational, shaped by state and community interests, by the divergences between those interests, and by the dynamics of the relationships amongst
communities and between communities and the state.
iv. Indigenous Systems
Because indigenous groups present the most compelling case for alternatives to liberalism according to the categories employed by democracy
210

THE HUMAN RIGHTS OMBUDSMAN OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA, ETHNIC EQUALITY AND
EQUAL OPPORTUNITIES IN BAH, http://www.ohro.ba/articles/policy.php?id=11 (last visited
Feb. 27, 2006).
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theorists, one of the classic minority rights questions is how to accommodate
indigenous interests in self-definition and self-governance with liberal ideals
when there is a risk of conflict between the two. National human rights institutions’ experiences in working with autonomous indigenous legal systems reveal the complexities that arise when they are confronted with this
tension in practice. But while liberal pluralists and communitarians struggle
over the proper balance between liberal and minority rights, national human
rights institutions typically seem to find the matter unproblematic, treating
deviations from liberal norms as unacceptable irrespective of their significance within the community’s system.
It is important to acknowledge at the outset that indigenous communities and cultures themselves are not singular but multiple, and differ amongst
each other as to values and practices as much as any one of them does to
state structures. Bedouin blood feuds, for example, have little in common
with Native American sentencing circles.211 Indigenous cultures are not
static but dynamic, and not necessarily isolationist but often interactive. Indeed, community laws and legal systems may not be ancient, customary, or
based in tradition. The image (and even to some extent the legal definition)
of indigenous peoples and their practices includes all of these elements, and
indigenous communities themselves may call on tradition or ancient origin
as legitimizing their laws and practices, even when those laws and practices
are of recent vintage. Both the state and the community may make use of
this notion of tradition as a basis for legitimacy and recognition. Therefore,
it is also important to recognize the tension between indigenous laws and
state laws is not necessarily one between old and new, between customary
and written, or between traditional and modern, but may be far more complex, reflecting the dynamic interactions between groups and systems.212 In
this sense, indigenous groups increasingly pose problem cases of the sort
discussed in part III, above. The Métis in Canada, as well as the Tlapanec
and other indigenous peoples in Mexico, have formed legal and political systems that are neither strictly indigenous nor defined by the state, but a deliberate blending of state and community ideals and practices.213
211

Likewise, as discussed above, the state structures and cultures in which such communities
act range from liberal democracies to authoritarian governments to failed states, and from
states with strong national identities to sharply divided states to states in which disparate cultures rarely interact. Thus, it would be misleading to speak of conflicts between the state and
indigenous cultures as if all such conflicts were of the same nature.
212
See TULLY, supra note 36, at 137; Ibhawoh, supra note 85, at 841; Hébert & Aubry, supra
note 172.
213
See BELL, supra note 123; Hébert & Aubry, supra note 172; Speed & Collier, supra note
171.
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There is also considerable variation in the level of mutual recognition
and interactivity between indigenous and state systems. Some states permit
their courts to recognize indigenous communities’ legal decisions or apply
some version of the community’s laws. So, for example, the South African
constitution affirms the legitimacy of tribal institutions and laws, the Ethiopian constitution permits the state to recognize religious courts, and the
United States recognizes the authority of tribal courts on Native American
reservations.214 In defining the relationship between recognized indigenous
systems and human rights norms, some constitutions expressly provide that
indigenous practices must comply with constitutional norms, while others,
like Zimbabwe’s, expressly exempt indigenous communities’ traditional
practices from certain constitutional norms such as anti-discrimination
rights.215 Where the constitution is silent or where indigenous practices are
themselves legitimized by the constitution, there is often ambiguity about
precedence. In Ethiopia, the constitution recognizes the rights of its “Nations, Nationalities and Peoples” as well as a range of individual rights and
does not indicate which should prevail in case of a conflict.216
Furthermore, it is not just state policies toward indigenous legal systems that vary; the extent to which indigenous systems accept or reject the
state’s system, and even the extent to which they take account of it, also varies substantially. Community institutions may apply customary, religious, or
other community-defined laws in place of, or in addition to, formal state law.
Some communities maintain jurisdiction over family and minor civil and
criminal matters while ceding larger cases to the state.217 Others claim jurisdiction over all issues, big or small.218 Indigenous communities may govern
areas that the state considers private, or vice versa.219
In such contexts, minority group concerns will first be defined within
the minority community itself in the context of the community’s self-defined
214

See S. AFR. CONST.; ETH. CONST.; Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978).
See ZIMB. CONST. art. 23(3); see also Ibhawoh, supra note 85, at 843. Within the United
States, Supreme Court decisions have granted partial but not absolute sovereignty to tribal
governments, and that sovereignty has at times been found to outweigh constitutional interests
such as equal protection. See Thomas Biolsi, Bringing the Law Back in: Legal Rights and the
Regulation of Indian-White Relations on Rosebud Reservation, 36 CURRENT ANTHROPOLOGY
543, 545 (1995).
216
See ETH. CONST. art. 39. See Ibhawoh, supra note 85, at 848 (Ghana and Uganda).
217
See Ibhawoh, supra note 85, at 846.
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See Hébert & Aubry, supra note 172 (Tlapanec community in Mexico).
219
See Mark D. Rosen, Our Non-Uniform Constitution: Geographical Variations of Constitutional Requirements in the Aid of Community, 77 TEX. L. REV. 1129, 1157 (1999) (discussing
practice of “welfare checks” on U.S. Native American reservations).
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political and legal system. Similarly, state concerns with community practices will confront a separate legal and political system operating under different norms and conceiving of the conflict in alternative legal and political
terms. The systems may differ not only in their substantive rules, but also in
their processes, and even in the underlying assumptions, cultural values, and
symbols that each system deploys.220
Several cases illustrate the role that national human rights institutions
have tended to play in their interactions with indigenous systems. In the
Karamoja region in Uganda, local intra-clan disputes over cattle raiding have
escalated into widespread violence. This violence has been exacerbated by
the operation of parallel community and state justice systems.221 Here, the
local communities’ system centers on direct compensation of the victim by
the perpetrator, rather than on incarceration or other punishments unrelated
to the victim.222 The Human Rights Commission regards this system as functionally granting impunity to the rich and does not consider it to be an effective system of criminal justice at all, asserting that a failure to pursue criminal charges in state court after compensation has been paid amounts to
leaving people “above the criminal justice system.”223 For their part, the
Karamojong prefer not to cooperate with the police and state justice system
for reciprocal reasons: they are not satisfied by its substantive and procedural
justice values, which have “failed to incorporate the traditional mechanism
of detection and punishment of crime.”224
As the inter-ethnic violence in the area has escalated, so has state involvement in the form of army intervention, arrests, and efforts by the Human Rights Commission to persuade the parties to disarm. The Commission
characterizes the violence in the area as itself being “human rights abuses
that invariably . . . draw[] in [the state] to avert, mitigate, or deal with a
situation.”225 It also describes the secondary conflict between the state and
local legal systems as one centered in human rights. In so doing, however,
while it criticizes failures and limitations in the state system, it does not take
220

See KIMM, supra note 110, at 91-92.
UGANDA HUMAN RIGHTS COMM’N, supra note 127, ¶ 2.2.2.1, at 19.
222
As the core dispute is over cattle raiding, it is striking that the system of compensation itself relies on cattle as the mode of compensation as well, suggesting that the cattle represent
in this context some return of status and dignity as well as their economic worth: “In a case
of murder, the culprit is fined 60 head of cattle and is supposed to undergo cleansing rituals.”
Id. ¶ 5.2.5, at 41.
223
Id. ¶ 5.2.6, at 41.
224
The “traditional justice system is based on the value system of the Karamojong.” Id. ¶
2.2.2.1, at 19.
225
Id. ¶ 2.2.2.2, at 19-20.
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account of minority rights or the local interest in maintaining their own system as a legitimate concern. Instead, the Commission describes the situation
as a “culture of impunity” in which the Karamajong have taken the law into
their own hands, driven by their misunderstanding of essential human rights
protection in the state system and fears of retribution for participation in it.226
Eventually, faced with the stalling of its disarmament program during a period of decreased security in the region, unable or unwilling to engage with
the indigenous justice system, and likewise unable to persuade the Karamojong to participate in the state system, the Commission saw its peacebuilding
efforts collapse in a series of violent raids and was forced to withdraw.227
Case studies of the Tlapanec, Tierra y Libertad, and Zincantan communities mentioned above also portray a human rights commission that has
taken a narrow view of the rights at stake. Here, the communities have initiated their own parallel judicial systems, which the Mexican government
views as illegitimate and as a challenge to its sovereignty.228
Human rights claims are present on all sides of these interactions. The
Tlapanec and other communities developed these judicial systems in response to inadequate police attention and alien legal standards, processes,
values, and languages within the state system. They allege violations of
their due process rights by the state, because state trials are conducted in
Spanish and they are not provided with translators. They also claim violations of their community justice norms: if an accused is imprisoned during
vital agricultural seasons, not only the defendant but his family will suffer as
a result. Finally, they assert that community rights to autonomy and selfdetermination authorize them to develop their own system. The Mexican
government, in contrast, contends that the communities’ legal processes violates due process norms by, for example, failing to provide defendants with
counsel and basic rights such as non-self-incrimination, and that the exercise
of criminal jurisdiction exceeds the scope of the community’s authority.229
The response of the National Commission for Human Rights has ranged
from non-involvement to direct criticism. In the Zincantan and Tierra y Libertad situations, it has criticized the indigenous systems for failing to adequately protect rights, while it apparently has had no involvement in the Tlapanec community. Like the Ugandan Commission, it has also criticized the
government for failing to maintain order and making arbitrary arrests in indigenous communities, but has treated these lapses as a separate matter from
226

Id. ¶ 14.4.2, at 116-17.
See id.
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See Hébert & Aubry, supra note 172, at 11; Speed & Collier, supra note 171.
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Speed & Collier, supra note 171.
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the legitimacy of the communities’ systems.230
Liberals, liberal pluralists, and communitarians characterize indigenous
communities as presenting a subtle problem of balancing liberal rights with
conflicting minority interests in norms of culture and autonomy. In developing and using their systems in preference to the state systems, indigenous
communities themselves express the predicted concerns with differences in
community and state values and justice norms. They also accuse the state of
violations not only of their community norms, but also of the state’s own
liberal protections. But national human rights institutions do not seem to be
engaging in an effort to weigh or analyze indigenous communities’ rights to
maintain their own systems of self-governance; rather, in their interactions
with indigenous systems, they are acting to defend purely liberal interests.231
IV. THE ROLE OF NATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS INSTITUTIONS
What is most striking about the work of national human rights institutions with minority groups is the limits of that work: the limits of the programs that exist in institutions now, the limits of the legal constructs that inform them, and the limits of institutional reports on the concerns of the
minority groups that come to them. What national human rights institutions
have reported is enough to suggest that democracy theory and the minority
rights available in positive law do not adequately account for some important
minority concerns. It also indicates that these institutions could serve as an
important forum for developing an understanding of minority claims and for
230

Mexico’s National Commission on Human Rights has an outreach program for indigenous
groups, and its constitution was amended in the 1990s to introduce indigenous rights. See
Notes on IOI Quebec Conference, supra note 81; Madrazo, supra note 105, at 337, 338, 352.
The Commission also has studied social economic and political conditions through its “Program for Natives.” Magdalena Aguilar Alvarez, The Teaching, Learning and Training Process for Human Rights, in THE INTERNATIONAL OMBUDSMAN ANTHOLOGY, supra note 67. The
Commission reports having investigated and issued a recommendation to the Governor of
Oaxaca in response to complaints from indigenous peoples, including complaints that indigenous people had not been arrested without being informed of the reason, denied a translator,
charged with crimes they had not committed, arrested and detained arbitrarily, and violently
attacked by police. See Recommendations, NEWSLETTER (National Commission for Human
Rights, Mexico), Apr. 2005, at 3. In similar cases, other indigenous groups have complained
either of being ignored by the Commission or of being criticized by it. See ICHRP REPORT,
supra note 2; Speed & Collier, supra note 171.
231
In this respect the warning issued by Lisa Statt Foy concerning the wisdom of introducing
the ombudsman institution into the First Nations system is apropos: “the essential characteristics of the ombudsman institution . . . are not culturally-neutral but reflect western values and
philosophy . . . . [and] may run contrary to a First Nation’s values, beliefs and traditional practices.” See Foy, supra note 157, at 78.
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addressing at least some of the unconventional claims they raise. Finally,
national human rights institutions offer an opportunity to assess the efficacy
of theorists and regional treaties’ calls for dialogue between minority groups
and the state, as put into practice on a day to day level.
A.

Identifying and Incorporating Minority Claims

In particular, the gaps between experience and theory discussed above
suggest that national human rights institutions could play a more systematic
role in developing a better understanding of minority concerns and principles
for addressing them. As illustrated above, when national human rights institutions are accessible to minority groups and receptive to their claims, they
obtain a wealth of direct information about the groups’ interests and concerns, including some that fall outside the typical understandings of minority
group rights. However, this information is little collected or considered, and
so it has not been taken into account in formulating policy or theory.232
By consistently identifying and discussing minority concerns in their
claims handling, independent investigations, and reports, national human
rights institutions could make this information available. Some institutions
are already doing this: the Slovenian Human Rights Ombudsman, for example, has devoted a considerable portion of its annual reports to extensive discussions of the concerns of minority groups. It has examined not only the
legally protected rights of national minorities, but also the neglected interests
of the Roma and the “erased” members of certain other minorities, thereby
exposing for consideration the minority concerns that still lie outside Slovenia’s legal framework of minority rights.233

232

The exception, as usual, is Europe: the European Centre for Minority Issues has a project
on ombudspersons and minority rights that has produced several reports on the work of ombudspersons’ offices in Europe and the role of ombudspersons in addressing minority rights in
the European context. See Lloydd & Morawa, supra note 67; EUROPEAN CTR. FOR MINORITY
ISSUES, MINORITY OMBUDSPERSON PROJECT NETWORK CONFERENCE REPORT (2003),
http://www.ecmi.de/doc/ombudsman/download/Berlin%20Conference%20Report.pdf [hereinafter NETWORK CONFERENCE REPORT]. The European Commission on Racism and Intolerance has also studied the European entities established to comply with EC Directive
200/43/EC. See European Commission on Racism and Intolerance, Examples of Good Practices: Specialized Bodies to Combat Racism, Xenophobia, Anti-Semitism and Intolerance at
National Level (June 13, 1997), available at http://www.coe.int/T/e/human_rights/ecri/4Publications/#P675_9404 (follow “Recommendation N° 2” hyperlink).
233
See HUMAN RIGHTS OMBUDSMAN OF SLOVENIA, supra note 185.
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i. Good Offices
There is one institutional practice in particular that could serve as a resource for discovering and understanding minority concerns that are not currently addressed in minority rights law and theory: good offices. “Good offices” refers to a national human rights institution’s use of its contacts,
influence, and mediation experience to conciliate a claim that does not actually fall within the institution’s formal jurisdiction.234 Good offices practices
vary considerably between institutions: some institutions will offer to conciliate virtually any claim that comes in the door, whereas others stick
closely to the terms of their mandate.235 In New Brunswick, for example,
where the human rights commission’s mandate is narrowly limited to discrimination and to events on non-tribal lands, one-third of the cases brought
were good offices cases, including complaints of political favoritism and
discrimination against tribal leaders, as well as derogatory comments by
public officials and the media, and other incidents falling outside the commission’s strictly defined jurisdiction.236 The commission in Ghana also encourages its local offices to accept good offices cases.237 Where institutions
do offer good offices services, a systematic evaluation of those cases might
yield valuable information about local concerns.
ii. Best Practices
In the same vein, because the resolutions reached by national human
rights institutions are neither binding nor precedent-creating, they present an
opportunity for experimentation with a range of solutions for minority group
problems and for development of “best practices” guidelines. Such guidelines offer a way of organizing, presenting, and comparing institutions’ successful experiences in working with minority groups. The European Commission on Racism and Intolerance has developed a set of good practices
guidelines for specialized institutions focused solely on racism and minority
interests, but it reviews the practices only of European entities.238 Because
234

If informal conciliation does not resolve the claim, than the institution must either step
aside or refer the claim to the agency that does have jurisdiction: informal efforts do not obligate the institution to take further formal steps to follow up on the claim, and indeed, by the
terms of its mandate it could not do so. See Williams, supra note 109, at 51-57.
235
See ICHRP REPORT, supra note 2, at 1-2.
236
See Williams, supra note 109, at 51-57.
237
See id. at 14-15.
238
See European Commission on Racism and Intolerance report, supra note 232; see also
EUROPEAN CTR. FOR MINORITY ISSUES, OMBUDSMAN INSTITUTIONS AND MINORITY ISSUES: A
GUIDE TO GOOD PRACTICE (Marnie Lloydd ed., 2005), available at http://www.ecmi.de/doc/

BAYLIS

128

9/11/2006

10 UCLA J. INT’L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 66 (2005)

minority interests are, as discussed above, highly various and contextual, experience-sharing amongst national, regional, and local contexts is crucial.
As with the good offices cases, information on resolution of minority claims,
and especially on efforts at systematic reform, ought to be collected and
made available in a systematic way. In so doing, national human rights institutions could serve as a laboratory for ideas that might ultimately percolate
up to the national level or be adopted by institutions in other regions.
iii. Addressing Claims
In addition, national human rights institutions are well-designed to address at least some of the minority group concerns they have uncovered that
do not fit the predicted mold. For example, Bruce Berman and others have
suggested that one of the fundamental obstacles to the development of effective democratic governance and inter-ethnic stability in Africa is that government bureaucracy functions according to destructive clientelism, defined
along ethnic lines.239 Similarly, in the experience of ombudspersons who
served indigenous communities, a large percentage of the complaints
brought against community leadership concerned conflicts of interest and
nepotism.240 The ombudsperson, with her mandate of rooting out government maladministration and favoritism of every kind, is ideally suited to address such concerns.
However, the capacity of individual national human rights institutions
to address the disparate demands of minority communities discussed above
depends to a large degree on their similarly disparate structures and legal
mandates.241 While ombudspersons may be well suited to addressing corruption and clientelism, other claims, such as those relating to economic and social inequalities or land rights, for example, might be beyond their legal jurisdiction and institutional expertise.
While national human rights
institutions may prove capable of systematically exposing unrecognized minority concerns, no small number of these may prove to be issues that they
ombudsman/download/guide_uk.pdf.
239
[T]he state bureaucracy is a realm of nepotistic appropriation of office, ethnically biased
distribution of patronage, extortion of bribes, and kick-backs and direct theft of public
revenues. . . . [D]emocratic reforms in Africa cannot succeed, the bonds of ethnic
communities cannot significantly relax and a civic politics of broader ties of cooperation
cannot develop without a corresponding transformation of the bureaucratic apparatus.
Bruce Berman, Ethnicity, Bureaucracy & Democracy: The Politics of Trust, in ETHNICITY
AND DEMOCRACY, supra note 160, at 38, 39.
240
See discussion supra section III, A.
241
See Kaltenbach, supra note 163, at 64-67.
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will not then have the capacity to address themselves.
B.

Dialogue and Consultation

National human rights institutions are also playing a role promoted by
theorists and demanded by minority rights treaties, but left largely undefined
by them: that of a forum for dialogue and consultation between minority
groups and the state.
i. In Theory and Practice
On a theoretical level, dialogue seems to mean all things to all people.
Democracy theorists envision a fundamental constitutional negotiation of the
essential nature of the relationship between minority groups and the state,
along the lines of James Tully’s “post-imperial dialogue on the just constitution of culturally diverse societies”242 Others propose dialogue for the purpose of nation-building in severely divided societies. Adeno Addis suggests
that “a genuine sense of shared identity, social integration, in multicultural
and multiethnic societies will develop only through a process where minorities and majorities are linked in institutional dialogue.”243 Similarly, Leslye
Obiora proposes that “‘dialogic democracy’—recognition of the authenticity
of the other, whose views and ideas one is prepared to listen to and debate,
as a mutual process—is the only alternative to violence in many areas of the
social order where disengagement is no longer a feasible option.”244 But
these theorists do not suggest how these dialogues might take place, nor
what particular characteristics would be necessary to provide an adequate
forum for their envisioned dialogues.245
Certainly national human rights institutions present a forum for dialogue
of some sort between minority groups and the state over human rights values. Their current reporting practices establish a dialogue of sorts between
242

TULLY, supra note 36, at 24; see also KYMLICKA, supra note 19, at 171 (Liberal states’
fundamental “[r]elations between national groups should be determined by dialogue” rather
than by forcible imposition of liberal values.).
243
Adeno Addis, On Human Diversity and the Limits of Toleration, in ETHNICITY AND GROUP
RIGHTS, supra note 32, at 30.
244
Obiora, supra note 159, at 660 (quoting Anthony Giddens, Living in Post-traditional Society, in Reflexive Modernization 56, 106 (Ulrich Beck et al. eds., 1994)); see also Ibhawoh,
supra note 85, at 854.
245
There are naysayers as well: Iris Young contends that multicultural participants in a dialogue cannot reach mutual understanding, while Chandran Kukathas expresses the concern
that they will understand each other, and that understanding will breed dislike and conflict.
See TULLY, supra note 36, at 132-33 (quoting Young); KUKATHAS, supra note 27, at 33.
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their informants (whether those be individuals, NGOs, or other groups), and
the government or international bodies that receive the reports and respond
to or comment on them. If they were to establish a process of systematically
collecting and considering the information they receive from minority claimants, as proposed above, that process itself could become a multi-layered
dialogue, moving from the local level to the national and back again, and accreting mutual understanding over time.
There are also a number of ways that national human rights institutions
already facilitate dialogue in a more immediate and direct sense. The Commission Nationale des Droits de l’Homme in Senegal, for example, does not
carry out independent investigations, but rather, serves as a conduit for
communication between international, national, and local, as well as governmental and non-governmental actors: a “forum within which nongovernmental organizations can . . . draw the attention of the authorities to possible
violations of human rights . . . an intermediary between the civil society and
officialdom,” and a means to use “international pressure . . . to reinforce[e]
the power of local initiative.”246 Other institutions play the role of intermediary in particular situations, either by formally mediating individual complaints on a regular basis, as does the Vanuatu Ombudsman, or by operating
as an informal conciliator or go-between from time to time, as the Fiji Ombudsman did for some period. 247 The investigation and reporting, education
and promotion activities that are at the core of most national human rights
institutions’ functions also represent a form of dialogue between the institution and its constituents.
But can the sort of dialogue carried on in national human rights institutions achieve such lofty goals as nation-building, social integration, and constitutional negotiation of the sort envisioned by theorists? The terms of national human rights institutions’ interactions with minority groups are to
some extent already set by external influences: the legal frameworks for their
offices, and the constraints of institutional competence and credibility. A national human rights institution’s mandate and its powers of investigation and
reporting are directed more toward enforcing known and understood legal
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See Senegal Report, in AFRICAN HRC REPORT, supra note 83, available at http://www.hrw
.org/reports/2001/africa/senegal/senegal.html. Djibouti’s Mediateur de la Republique reportedly plays a similar role. See Mediateur de la Republique website, http://www.mediateur.dj/
discours.htm (last visited Feb. 27, 2006).
247
See Hill, supra note 74, at 149. A number of other institutions report mediating claims,
either formally or through an informal process of negotiation, including Cameroon’s National
Commission for Human Rights and Freedoms and Ghana’s Commission on Human Rights
and Administrative Justice.
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rights than toward defining those rights in the first place.248
Where the basis for minority rights is limited, where the balance between minority rights, individual rights and state values is a hotly debated
political question, and especially where there is of yet no established legal
framework for striking this balance, an attempt to define and determine these
issues independently takes the institution well outside its usual activities and
threatens to strain its credibility and legitimacy both with the government
and with the public.249 In new democracies, where rights are as yet illdefined, national human rights institutions may find themselves playing this
role.250 However, it is not clear that these institutions will, except at times by
happenstance, have the legal and political resources to do so effectively.
Furthermore, while the institution may have the authority to recommend
change, it does not have the authority itself to enact that change either upon
the law or the essential political structure of the state, and so it is not in a position to negotiate fundamental constitutional change of the sort envisioned
by many democracy theorists for cross-cultural dialogue. Instead, where
such a negotiation is taking place, a national human rights institution might
more effectively contribute by observing, commenting on, and publicizing
the proceedings than by participating itself.
ii. With Indigenous Systems
Working with indigenous legal systems presents an additional layer of
complexity. In interacting with indigenous legal systems, the Ugandan and
Mexican human rights commissions found themselves confronting different
processes, different punishments, and fundamentally different conceptions of
justice. Neither institution tried to participate in the indigenous system or to
make use of its terms of reference; rather, the indigenous system’s concerns
were considered solely in terms of the rights, interests, and processes available in the state system. Similarly, the New Brunswick Commission in its
work with local Native American communities employed its own definition
248

See Kaltenbach, supra note 163, at 65.
[A]n ombudsman may protect only what is guaranteed by the legal system, but
no ombudsman may protect something that does not exist. The rights of minorities were, for quite some time, not included in the list of internationally recognised human rights. This situation has changed materially only during the recent
decade but the emancipation of the rights of minorities cannot be considered as
fully resolved, even today.

Id.
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See Notes on IOI Quebec Conference, supra note 81.
See NETWORK CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 232, at 19-20.
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of discrimination and equality, not the community’s.
Can there be a meaningful or effective dialogue between indigenous
communities and the state if the indigenous community must always frame
its interests in the state’s terms and pursue them through state processes and
institutions? While many liberal theorists appear to endorse the notion that
productive dialogue can be had on the state’s terms, against the background
of liberal institutions and values, indigenous groups contend that their concerns are fundamentally misstated and misunderstood in this context.251
Likewise, communitarian commentators assert that “the dialogue must be
one in which the participants are recognised and speak in their own languages and customary ways.”252 Meanwhile, other theorists argue that there
can be no productive cross-cultural communication: the participants will either be unable to understand each other or will be repulsed by each other’s
utterly foreign concerns.253 At a minimum, the parties must agree upon some
common forum to carry on a dialogue at all,254 and currently such dialogue is
being carried out only in state-defined fora such as the courts and the national human rights institutions.255 Is there an alternative?
One possibility would be for a national human rights institution to adapt
to the community’s system in certain contexts, either by participating in the
community’s cultural, legal, and political processes, or by incorporating
some aspects of the community’s system. This would permit the indigenous
group to participate in defining the forum and the terms of discussion. As
discussed above, national human rights institutions’ capacity to serve as fora
251

Tenant & Turpel, supra note 60, at 291.
The adjudicative mechanism proposed by the state, namely the domestic legal
system, is inadequate. Within domestic legal systems, indigenous claims are divided and translated into categories that decontextualise and depoliticize them.
Claims for political recognition become questions of minority rights, language
rights, equality rights and education rights. Collective claims by indigenous
peoples are read down to become individual claims by indigenous persons. In
every case, concepts like justiciability and the separation of law and politics are
used to purge these claims of any political content which is offensive to the
state, or which challenges the notion that the state represents the population.
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TULLY, supra note 36, at 24.
See discussion supra note 245.
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Adeno Addis raises a similar concern regarding choice of language: “How does the notion
of pluralistic solidarity, which emphasizes dialogue among groups and societies as networks
of communication, deal with the question of linguistic plurality? . . . [H]ow would dialogue
(and shared deliberation) be possible without the dominant group coercively imposing a single language (more likely its language) on all citizens?” Addis, supra note 243, at 138.
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See TULLY, supra note 36; ANAYA, supra note 199.
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for dialogue with minority groups is limited: they do not have the authority
to participate in negotiation over allocation of rights and resources, for example. But where such weighty matters are not at stake, national human
rights institutions might be better placed than other institutions to participate
in this sort of innovative dialogue with indigenous groups. Because their
procedures tend to be more informal and flexible than those of courts, many
have some freedom to vary their practices to some extent. Depending on the
particular terms of their mandates, the Ugandan and Mexican human rights
commissioners could conceivably appear before community courts or councils. Alternatively, they could develop their own processes for considering
complaints that make use of some community rituals or procedures, such as
the Karamajong’s post-compensation rituals for reconciliation of a criminal
with the community.
Another relevant feature of human rights institutions is their focus on
discussion and conciliation as a first approach to conflict. Although the extent to which indigenous groups rely on consensual systems for conflict
resolution is often overstated, in at least some instances there may be commonalities between institutions. Ombudspersons in places as disparate as
Burkina Faso and Canada reported feeling a sense of compatibility between
their techniques and local preferences for conciliatory approaches to conflict
resolution.256 The indigenous assessment, however, has been more skeptical
about the extent of the resemblance: “In order for the commission to serve
Native people they have to understand Native people. They have to learn
about Native cultures, traditions, and spirituality.”257
So far, only a few institutions have tried to apply this prescription. Even
among institutions with programs or officers devoted to an indigenous group
or groups, almost none have tried to participate in or incorporate indigenous
practices in any way. The examples are scattered: an ombudsperson for
American Indian Families in Minnesota engages in traditional prayer and
rituals with her clients before beginning meetings;258 a local Argentinean
ombudsperson’s office that works extensively with the indigenous Mapuche
people held a workshop to train its employees in traditional Mapuche media256

E-mails from Marianne von der Esch of the Swedish Ombudsman’s office suggested that
the use of prominent local leaders to head local offices and vigorous public education campaigns had also been crucial to success in Burkina Faso. E-mails from Marianne von der
Esch, Head of International Division, The Parliamentary Ombudsmen, Sweden (May 21, 23
& 31, 2003) [hereinafter von der Esch correspondence] (notes on file with author).
257
Williams, supra note 109, at 107-09.
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Telephone Interview with Dawn Blanchard, Ombudsman for American Indian Families
(Sept. 22, 2003).
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tion techniques;259 and the African Ombudsman Association discussed the
topic of reclaiming traditional mediation practices at its 2003 annual meeting.260
Pursuing this approach poses difficulties and risks, for both the institution and the community. This is not an easy task. If most human rights institutions have not mustered the will and resources to engage in simple outreach programs to minority groups, such as hiring staff who speak local
languages, it is unlikely that they will organize themselves to master local
legal systems. 261 Nor did it seem, in the Ugandan and Mexican situations at
least, as if the involved institutions had any interest in doing so. Furthermore, even if undertaken in good faith, walking the tightrope of participating
259

E-mails from Blanca Tirachini, Defensora del Pueblo de la ciudad de Neuquen, Argentina
(May 16 & 19, 2003) (notes on file with author); E-mail from María Laura Cassiet, Defensor
del Pueblo de la Nacion, Argentina (June 26-27, 2003) (notes on file with author); and von
der Esch correspondence, supra note 256.
260
E-mail from Bience Gawanas, Office of the Ombudsman of Namibia (May 20, 2003) (on
file with author). In one region in South Africa, it was not a human rights institution but local
police who adopted indigenous practices in an effort to bridge a divide between liberal rights,
security concerns, and minority rights in addressing accusations of witchcraft and witch killings and trials. John and Jean Comaroff describe what they call “a small vanguard of diviner
detectives” in a local police force:
Described in the national media as “one of the few success stories in a police
force that has almost collapsed under the strain of democracy,” Gopane uses
methods that require a high level of local knowledge. At relevant moments, he
exchanges his police uniform for the paraphernalia of a traditional healer. In
him, the forensic and the oracular, scientific investigation and social diagnostics,
become one. . . . While such efforts remain unorthodox and limited, they do
seem to be spreading; the SAPS liaison officer in the Northwest Province, Patrick Asneng, told us that dealing with the occult has become part of the mundane
work of policing in the countryside.
John Comaroff & Jean Comaroff, Policing Culture, Cultural Policing, 29 LAW & SOC.
INQUIRY 513, 530-31 (2004).
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Numerous authors have noted the difficulty of understanding the fundamental concepts of
another legal system. See, e.g., Vivian Grosswald Curran, Cultural Immersion, Difference
and Categories in U.S. Comparative Law, 46 AM. J. COMP. L. 43 (1998). Concerning Malay
customary law, Joseph Minattur asserts that:
The only persons who can be expected to have a clear understanding and a
proper appraisal of customary law are the traditional leaders of the community.
They are interested in maintaining the norms of their community and to them
should be instructed the administration of the customary law. They will know
how to reinterpret it to keep pace with social changes, changes which their own
community has accepted as being relevant to it.
Joseph Minattur, The Nature of Malay Customary Law, in 1 FOLK LAW 558 (Alison Dundes
Renteln & Alan Dundes eds., 1994).
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in community processes without becoming a part of them is likely to strain
institutional capacity and credibility, particularly in contexts like these where
the institutions themselves present conflicting human rights concerns.262
Such engagement also presents a risk of undermining the indigenous
system. In the past, efforts by states to incorporate indigenous legal systems
have represented a mechanism for state hegemony over the community,
rather than an attempt at true dialogue or genuine acceptance of community
norms as constitutive of the state. The most well-known examples are those
of efforts by colonial states to codify their understanding of the customary
law used by the peoples they colonized.263 Colonial governments’ misapprehension of, mischaracterization of, and misuse of indigenous religious and
community legal norms has been well documented across numerous settings
and cultures.264 In some cases, as in South Africa and the Democratic Republic of Congo, these systems spawned inter-ethnic conflicts that outlasted the
systems themselves.265 Such problems have not been limited to colonial set-
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Even if operating with the best of intentions, an outsider’s perception of the significant aspects of another’s system is likely to depend on her own interests in the system. Human
rights advocates, alternative dispute resolution advocates, and others tend to acknowledge and
legitimize selective elements of indigenous legal processes that favor their projects, such as
mediation practices, and ignore elements that would undermine their projects, such as corporal or capital punishment. They also tend to acknowledge and legitimize community values
that align with their projects, such as respect for the environment, but to declare the hegemony of human rights values when there is a conflict, as in the case of child marriage.
263
See MARTIN CHANOCK, LAW, CUSTOM AND SOCIAL ORDER (1985); see also UGANDA
HUMAN RIGHTS COMM’N, supra note 127, at 39-40. This was problematic on several levels:
first, the colonial codifiers rarely got it right; second, they transplanted the customary law into
the colonial system and process and thereby changed it; and third, they used this process as a
means to implement a two-tier system of justice in which those they colonized invariably occupied the lower tier. See Robert J. Gordon, The White Man’s Burden, in FOLK LAW, supra
note 260, at 367, 369-70.
264
See, e.g., M.B. HOOKER, LEGAL PLURALISM: AN INTRODUCTION TO COLONIAL AND NEOCOLONIAL LAWS (1975); CHANOCK, supra note 263.
265
In South Africa, “institutionalization of customary law was thus part of a process for redistributing power” during the colonial period in South Africa, “deceiv[ing] people into believing that law supported their interests.” See Gordon, supra note 263, at 369-70. The ultimate
consequences of this approach of indirect rule through newly established, ostensibly local institutions was often dire: in South Kivu in what is now the Democratic Republic of Congo,
the institution of indirect rule through anointment of certain ethnic groups with Native Authorities institutionalizing their indigenous status and authority in certain regions enabled the
later disenfranchisement of others not so designated, anointing some as rights-bearing citizens
and denigrating others as non-indigenous immigrants, and thereby catalyzing what is still ongoing ethnic conflict. See MAHMOOD MAMDANI, WHEN VICTIMS BECOME KILLERS 247-61
(2001).
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tings. Rather, efforts by the former Derg government in Ethiopia to import
their own progressive rules on marriage into a local village council model
served to undermine the council system.266 By attempting to adapt or participate in indigenous legal systems, a national human rights institution risks
serving as a mechanism for state oppression of indigenous groups, stirring
up conflict between the state and the group through more intensive and frequent interaction, or undermining its own credibility, with the indigenous
group, with other communities, or with the government.
There are ways of mitigating these risks, to some extent. The Argentinean, Minnesota, and African Ombudsman Association efforts above all involve limited institutional incorporation of certain aspects of local practices
into their own systems, rather than an attempt to create an entirely new system or to wrest jurisdiction from local institutions. The Mapuche and African focus on mediation techniques represents an effort to choose elements of
indigenous practice that are most closely aligned to pre-existing institutional
practices. All three are focused on resolving problems of accessibility and
effective communication within their ordinary tasks of considering community complaints, rather than being aimed at more lofty goals of negotiating
fundamental relationships between the community and the state. Of course,
such efforts should be pursued only upon an expression of interest by the indigenous community. An indigenous community member or members
might act as the community’s representative within the institution. Depending upon community preferences for its level of involvement, an institution
might keep itself apart from internal community systems but incorporate
some aspects of the community systems into its practices, or alternatively,
might appear as a representative of the state within the community system
but make no effort to adapt community practices in its own work.
In weighing the risks and benefits of encouraging national human right
institutions to adapt in some ways to indigenous legal systems, it must be
admitted that while any attempt to do so will be inherently problematic, the
status quo is no less so. As it is, indigenous communities have no choice but
to interact with the state in state institutions, through state processes, according to the state’s terms—conditions that some communities regard as manifestly unjust.
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From the state’s perspective, the councils were problematic because they tended to function by finding ways to accommodate the formal rules to local preferences. From the community’s perspective, the council’s use of the formal rules undermined their authority, which
stemmed from knowledge of, and adherence to, community practices. TRANSPLANTS,
INNOVATION AND LEGAL TRADITION IN THE HORN OF AFRICA (Elisabetta Grande ed., 1995).
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iii. In Minority Rights Treaties
In the new minority rights treaties, dialogue is not the basis for establishing a just framework for the state, but rather, an iterative, ongoing process of consultation and participation in governance. Nonetheless, here it
should be other government agencies, rather than national human rights institutions, that should undertake much of the kind of consultation called for
by international treaties such as ILO Convention No. 169 and the Framework Convention for National Minorities. The purpose of those provisions
is to guarantee minorities’ involvement in the process of government policy
making: the ILO Convention requires the state to consult with indigenous
groups in deciding public policy matters relevant to them, while the Framework Conventions mandates that states take measures to ensure national minorities’ effective participation in public affairs.267 Such consultations and
participation would be meaningless unless they took place with an institution
with decision-making authority in the matters at stake. Here, again, a national human rights institution might more effectively contribute to the circumstances necessary for a productive dialogue, by identifying and drawing
attention to the need for minority participation and by observing and publicizing the course of negotiations.
A national human rights institution may be particularly well suited to establish the setting for consultation and policy making in matters where it has
used its accessibility and experience with minority claims to explore minority interests and to build up knowledge of them gradually over time. An institution that is receptive to minority claims is in a unique position, not only
to address minority claims that lie beneath the surface of already identified
minority interests and rights, but also to bring those claims up to the surface
and to call upon government agencies to carry out their treaty responsibilities
of consultation when those arise.
CONCLUSION
By their structure, mandates, and skills, national human rights institutions could play a role in addressing minority rights in democracies new and
old, but often, they do not. Lack of legal incentives, political will, and resources all limit their involvement, as do legal frameworks that mischaracterize the players and the issues, driven by democratic theory developed
primarily in well-established states. There are some minority interests, especially those in highly conflict-ridden states or concerning highly politicized
issues, that national human rights institutions are unlikely to deal with effec267

See discussion, supra, Section I, B.
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tively, due to their structure, mandates, and the limits of their authority. But
there are others that these institutions are well suited to address. Developments in the European Union and other regions suggest that regional systems
and institutions may be better placed than international ones to define minority interests and to encourage national human rights institutions to consider
them. In particular, national human rights institutions could enrich the
framework of minority rights and the understanding of minority interests that
is its foundation by attentively considering minority claims, whether or not
those fit within currently protected rights, and making their observations
concerning those claims systematically available. National human rights institutions could also serve as contributors and watchdogs, and less frequently, as participants, in dialogue between minority groups and the state.
Liberal and communitarian theorists have looked for centering principles to provide a fixed point to which these disparate minority claims might
relate and to serve as the philosophical core justifying consideration of their
concerns. Minority demands, such as the Tlapanec’s, for toleration of their
cultural practices could be characterized, for example, as a group demand for
liberty, for group freedom from state interference. This characterization is
an appealing one on certain levels, for it frames the group’s demand in terms
that resonate with liberal philosophy and can therefore be analyzed in traditional liberal terms. Demands for liberty are common currency in our courts
and legislatures, and so these institutions feel themselves equipped to balance such claims with other concerns. Under such a construction, in any
given case, a group demand for liberty might stand in tension with an individual demand for liberty within the group or with the state’s interest in
promoting goals of equality or security. In this vein, Kymlicka and other
liberal pluralists seek to define minority interests in terms of their relation to
individual autonomy.
But while it may be appealing for these reasons to characterize minority
and indigenous interests as being claims for liberty, they do not seem to fit
the mold. Isaiah Berlin long ago argued that the desire for internal community autonomy “has little to do with the classical Western notion of liberty as
limited only by the danger of doing harm to others.”268 He characterized this
instead as a desire for “recognition—of their class or nation, or colour or
race—as an independent source of human activity, as an entity with a will of
its own, intending to act in accordance with it (whether it is good, or legitimate or not), and not to be ruled, educated, guided.”269 Rather than repre268
Isaiah Berlin, The Search for Status, reprinted in THE POWER
Hardy ed., 2000).
269
Id. at 195.
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senting an increase in liberty amongst the group, this recognition of community existence and independence may well reduce the liberty of its members,
who will to some extent be governed by this community identity—but who
may prefer that identity and governance to non-recognition and liberty.270
And since Berlin, other efforts have been made to refine this notion of “recognition” or “belonging” and the tensions it presents with guaranteed liberty
rights.271 Communitarians such as Tully have accordingly characterized minority claims as being alternative forms of self-rule.
In so doing, however, liberal and communitarian theorists have clung to
the notion that minority concerns could be characterized in terms of some
single unifying principle, even as they recognized the relational and disparate nature of those claims. In contrast, Chandran Kukathas has cautioned
against casting all minority group claims in the same mold, and the experiences and analysis of national human rights institutions suggest that this
warning is correct.272
Indeed, one reason for the diverse nature of the minority rights and
claims reported by national human rights institutions seems to be that they
should be understood not as absolute unchanging interests, but as claims that
are developed in relation to, and in some sense even as a reverse image of,
the interests of the state. What the state and the majority understand to be
“minority rights” is not the set of all interests that a minority group claims,
but rather, only the subset of those interests that do not happen, in their state,
to coincide with those of the majority. This is true of the liberal approach as
well as the others: minorities’ expressed interests in liberal values are not
understood as minority interests, merely ordinary ones. So to Kymlicka and
Tully, living in a liberal democratic state that guarantees individual rights as
a matter not only of course but of national identity, minority claims appear to
be claims for the autonomy to pursue community-defined values, even if
they are at times illiberal values. But for other states with other concerns,
minority claims resound differently, according to their own terms of power.
In this vein, Adeno Addis’s comment on an additional aspect of minority interests is telling:
The complaints many cultural and ethnic minorities have against majorities is not that they are forbidden to affirm privately their convictions and commitments and the capacity to plead as special interests
in the political and economic markets, but rather that they ought not
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See id. at 197.
See ZAKARIA, supra note 170.
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See KUKATHAS, supra note 27, at 33-34.
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be seen as special, narrow and private interests while the culture and
the ethnic affiliation of the majority is viewed implicitly or explicitly
as representing the general interest.273

Confronted by these narrow definitions of their interests, minority
communities and national human rights institutions engage in actively shaping and recharacterizing minority interests, thereby also redefining what they
consider “minority rights” and how those should be applied to minority concerns.
Because minority rights are, in the end, not absolute but relational, relative to the nature of relationships amongst communities and between communities and the state, democratic theory and concepts of rights based in the
experiences of well-established liberal democratic states cannot be expected
to capture the concerns of minority groups in new and severely divided democracies. Although new democracies are adopting either liberal or communitarian forms of government that superficially bear the forms advocated
by liberal and communitarian democratic theory, and although they may use
the rhetoric of liberal and minority rights to describe and justify their
choices, their purposes in doing so and the effects on minority group concerns are not likely to follow the predicted path. In these complex contexts,
national human rights institutions could serve as a necessary forum for exposing and considering these disparate and disputed minority rights.
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Addis, supra note 243, at 125.

